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Why „Democracy‟ and „Drifter‟ Firms Can Have Abnormal Returns:  
The Joint Importance of Corporate Governance and Abnormal Accruals in 
Separating Winners from Losers 
 
 





Do managers exercise accounting discretion in an opportunistic or efficient manner? 
Good governance structures, which mitigate agency costs, are necessary to ensure that the 
accounting information supplied by management is not opportunistically manipulated. The 
output of quality accounting information, in turn, serves as an  input to better governance 
structures.  Thus,  governance  and  earnings  quality  (EQ)  are  inexorably  linked  through  a 
complementarity relationship. This suggests two previously unexamined relationships. Firstly, 
the governance effects on performance in the influential paper by Gompers, Ishii and Metrick 
(2003) is overrated without good EQ, measured by the magnitude of abnormal accruals (AA), 
as an input. I find evidence that removing firms with Low AA attenuates the good governance 
(Democracy) portfolio returns to no different from zero over the period of 1991-2008. Good 
governance per se no longer pays off. Isolating the long portfolio of Democracy firms with 
Low AA generates a positive abnormal return of 10.5 percent per year from 1991 to 2008. 
Secondly,  the  uncertainty  associated  with  the  abnormal  accruals  signal  is  interactively 
resolved with information about the firm‟s governance structure, and the unique pairing of the 
signals contains unique information about the future prospects of the firm. Thus, firms with 
high  or  extreme  income-increasing  AA,  when  accompanied  by  weak  (Dictatorship)  and 
mixed (Drifter) governance structures, have negative abnormal future returns as predicted in 
the seminal paper by Sloan (1996), but Democracy firms have positive abnormal returns. The 
results  suggest  either  that  abnormal  accruals  are  a  coarse  measure  of  EQ  or  earnings 
manipulation for good governance firms, or that their shareholders benefit from “earnings 
management” because the high abnormal accruals signals future performance. Overall, the 
results highlight the joint importance of governance and abnormal accruals in contributing to 
the total information environment to separate winners from losers.  
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1.  Introduction and Motivation 
Investors willingly part their capital with managers on the assurance that the self-
serving  managers  will  exercise  their  discretionary  rights  appropriately  to  increase 
shareholders‟ wealth and not expropriate assets away. Managerial discretion can be used to 
make reported earnings a precise signal of firm value and managerial performance, enhancing 
the value of accounting as a language to communicate with the investors. Consequently, the 
allocation and utilization flow of capital is made more responsive since financial accounting 
information  provides  investors  an  important  source  of  information  to  help  them  better 
evaluate  the  relative  health  and  worth  of  the  enterprise  and  to  make  better  investment 
decisions.  However,  managerial  discretion  can  also  be  used  to  engage  in  earnings 
management  to  conceal  poor  performance  or  to  exaggerate  good  performance,  either  for 
career concerns or compensation reasons. Healy (1996) termed the former motive to be the 
Performance Measurement (or Efficient Contracting) Hypothesis, and the latter to be the 
Opportunistic Hypothesis.  
Accruals in accounting are estimates of future cash realizations, with considerable 
room  for  managerial  discretion  in  their  reporting.  Most  accruals  reverse  when  the  cash 
consequences they anticipate are realized and the subsequent realization of the cash has no 
impact on earnings. However, since accruals are estimates of expected future cashflows, the 
original accrual may not always equal the subsequent cash realization. In such cases, the 
difference between the original accrual and the associated future cash realization must be 
recognized in  future earnings.  Since the intriguing results  in  the seminal  paper by Sloan 
(1996) that high or income-increasing (low or income-decreasing) accruals are related to 
negative (positive) future stock returns, evidence of high or income-increasing accruals have 
been widely interpreted and justified as bookkeeping mischief and a signal of low earnings 
quality  (EQ),  in  favor  of  the  Opportunistic  Hypothesis.  For  instance,  a  big  increase  in 7 
 
inventory accruals is interpreted as signalling a greater likelihood that inventories overstate 
their associated future benefits,  and implied a  greater likelihood of subsequent  inventory 
write-downs to be reflected in future earnings.  
Yet, accruals may also serve as leading indicators of changes in a firm‟s prospects, 
without  any  manipulation  by  managers.  Since  management  presumably  have  superior 
information about their firm‟s cash generating ability, the discretion provided by GAAP in 
estimating  accruals  can  be  used  by  management  to  signal  their  private  information  to 
investors, so that reported earnings will more closely reflect firm performance than realized 
cashflows (Holthausen and Leftwich, 1983; Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Holthausen, 1990; 
Healy and Palepu, 1993; Subramanyam, 1996; Bartov, Givoly, and Hayn, 2002). Thus, a 
credible  signal  will  reduce  information  asymmetry,  in  support  of  the  Performance 
Management Hypothesis. Given the overwhelming support of the Opportunistic Hypothesis, 
management  is  deemed  with  having  nefarious  intentions  for  purchasing  inventory  above 
beginning inventory levels even if this was  a positive net present value decision.  Joshua 
Livnat,  accounting  professor  at  the  New  York  University‟s  Stern  School  of  Business 
commented that “I don‟t think you can use accruals to decide whether management is acting 
in  the best  interests of  shareholders,” and that  he is  “usually not  happy  second-guessing 
management or attributing to them a lot of sinister motives” (Trammell, 2010). 
As the output of  financial accounting information is  produced by management, it 
suggests  that  good  governance  structures,  which  mitigate  agency  costs  and  shown  to  be 
important in determining firm value in the influential paper by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 
(GIM,  2003),  are  necessary  to  ensure  that  the  accounting  information  supplied  by 
management is not opportunistically manipulated in response to a variety of incentives, and 
hence the signals produced by management can be reliably assessed by external parties. The 
output of EQ, in turn, serve as an input to better governance structures and corporate control 8 
 
mechanisms  to  improve  the  productivity  of  investments  through  three  channels:  one,  by 
increasing the efficiency with which the assets in place are managed (governance channel); 
two,  by  reducing  the  error  with  which  managers  identify  good  versus  bad  investments 
(project identification); and three, by reducing the information asymmetries among investors 
and the expropriation of investors‟ wealth (adverse selection) (Bushman and Smith, 2001; 
Sloan, 2001).   
Thus, it is clear that corporate governance and financial accounting are inexorably 
linked through a  complementarity relationship.  Complementarity,  as  pointed out  by  Ball, 
Jayaraman and Shivakumar (2010), implies that “financial reporting usefulness depends on 
its  contribution  to  the  total  information  environment,  whereas  substitutability  implies 
usefulness depends on the new information it releases on a stand-alone basis.” Thus, both 
governance and accruals information are jointly informative; each may contain information 
not contained in the other about the future prospects of the firm. Importantly, this suggests 
the possibility of two previously unexamined relationships that will be explored further in 
this paper.  
Firstly, I posit that governance could be overrated without abnormal accruals (AA) as 
an input. The results in GIM (2003) indicate that the hedge portfolio of buying firms with 
strong governance (Democracy), and selling firms with weak governance (Dictatorship), can 
generate significant long-term abnormal return of 8.5 percent per year over the sample period 
from September 1990 to December 1999. The hedge returns are asymmetrically positioned, 
with 3.5 (5.0) percent from the long (short) position of the Democracy (Dictatorship) firms. 
In  particular,  I  argue  that  it  is  possible  that  the  good  governance  associated  with  future 
positive abnormal stock returns could be attenuated when the subset of Democracy firms with 
low or extreme income-decreasing AA is removed. Thus, good governance per se does not 
lead to future positive abnormal return, contrary to the findings in GIM (2003). In other 9 
 
words, good governance on a stand-alone basis no longer pays off. Isolating the Democracy 
firms  with  Low  AA  should  also  enhance  significantly  the  governance  effects  on  future 
positive  abnormal  return.  In  addition, mixed governance (Drifter)  and  Dictatorship firms 
with Low AA should have positive abnormal return. 
In support of this view, with AA estimated as the residual in the Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) model, I find evidence that removing firms with low or extreme income-decreasing 
AA will reduce the Democracy portfolio return to no different from zero statistically over the 
period  of  1991-2008,  and  over  the  sub-period  of  1991-1999  that  was  examined  in  GIM 
(2003).  In  addition,  the  portfolio  of  Democracy  firms  with  Low  AA  generates  a  positive 
abnormal return of 10.5 percent per year from 1991 to 2008, which is not only economically 
larger (700 basis points) than the long position documented in GIM (2003), but is also 200 
basis points more than the entire hedge return. In addition, the incremental value in the good 
governance  and  Low  AA  signal  yields  3.9  and  7.0  percent  abnormal  return  per  year 
respectively.  Specifically,  these  Democracy-Low  AA  firms  (dubbed  Super-Performers) 
significantly outperform the unconditional Low AA (Democracy) firms, revealing incremental 
value in the good governance (Low AA) signal, thus lending weight to the intuition behind a 
complementarity relationship between the two signals. Interestingly, some of these Super-
Performers include well-known, institutional big-cap stocks, such as Coca-Cola Co, AT&T, 
Hewlett-Packard,  Wyeth,  Nordstrom,  Lowe‟s,  Home  Depot,  and  EMC,  formed  in  the 
portfolio at various months in the sample period. Drifter firms with Low AA deliver abnormal 
return  at  6.2  percent  per  year;  Dictatorship  firms  with  Low  AA  have  positive,  albeit 
statistically insignificant, abnormal return.  
Of great interest and debate in the literature is the question of whether investors are 
able to “see through” transitory distortions in accrual accounting numbers. The explanation 
by Sloan is that investors are thought to be overly-fixated on earnings (the Earnings-Fixation 10 
 
Hypothesis),  misinterpreting  the  transitory  nature  of  the  accruals  information,  only  to  be 
systematically  surprised  when  accruals  turn  out,  in  the  future,  to  be  less  persistent  than 
cashflows.  Consequently,  abnormal  stock  returns  result  as  corrections  to  the  initial 
overreaction in the year immediately following extreme accruals. Thus, Sloan views future 
reversals to be a result of aggressive or “bad” accounting that originally inflate accruals. 
Accordingly, a hedge portfolio that buys (sells) firms with low (high) accruals can generate 
annualized abnormal  return  of 10.4 percent,  with  4.9 (5.5) percent  from  the long (short) 
position in the subsequent year. Further evidence by Xie (2001), DeFond and Park (2001), 
and Chan, Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (2006) indicate that this “accruals anomaly” is 
related  to  abnormal,  or  sometimes  called  discretionary,  accruals.  They  argue  that  certain 
discretionary actions on the part of managers induce a transitory element to accruals, with 
stronger mean-reverting tendency of discretionary accruals, defined using the Dechow et al 
(1996) modified Jones model, leading to an overpricing of aggregate accruals. However, a 
limitation of Sloan‟s study is that the returns predictability could be attributed to unidentified 
risk factors that is correlated with accruals or unknown research design flaws (Kothari, 2001). 
Healy (1996) pointed out that one major deficiency is the inability of these accruals model to 
“adequately incorporate the effect of changes in business fundamentals.” Healy and Whalen 
(1999)  also  highlighted  their  inadequacy  to  “further  identify  and  explain  which  types  of 
accruals are used for earnings management and which are not”. 
Therefore, and secondly, I argue that the conventional interpretation of EQ, measured 
by  the  magnitude  of  abnormal  accruals,  could  vary  across  governance  structures.  The 
uncertainty associated with the abnormal accruals signal - that is, managerial discretion could 
be  interpreted  as  either  opportunistic  or  conveying  credible  private  signal  about  firm 
performance  -  is  interactively  resolved  with  information  about  the  firm‟s  governance 
structure, and the unique pairing of the signals contains unique information about the future 11 
 
prospects of the firm. Abnormal accruals, when accompanied by good governance, become 
more informative and the interactive combined signal  corroborates with  the  Performance 
Management Hypothesis. In particular, firms with high or extreme income-increasing AA, 
usually  interpreted  as  evidence  of  earnings  management,  will  not  have  negative  future 
abnormal return if they happen to be also Democracy firms, contrary to the predictions in 
Sloan (1996). Such an interpretation will be strengthened in an additional test if there is 
evidence such that when the portfolio of firms with revelation of high or extreme income-
increasing  accruals  in  period  t  experiences  the  biggest  magnitude  in  accruals  reversal  in 
period t+1, those who are also Democracy firms will have positive future abnormal return, 
not negative return as was predicted under Sloan‟s hypothesis. The trend of reported earnings 
and the subsequent accruals reversals at these firms are interpreted as credible private signals 
of firm performance by the managers, resulting in larger positive future stock return, as it has 
been shown that earnings trend consistency is valued at a premium by the market (Barth, 
Elliott, and Finn, 1999), as is consistency in benchmark performance (Bartov et al, 2002; 
Kasznik  and  McNichols,  2002;  Koonce  and  Lipe,  2010).  Firms  with  extreme  income-
increasing accruals, when accompanied by Dictatorship and Drifter governance structures, 
have negative future stock returns, consistent with Sloan‟s predictions.  
Corroborating evidence indicate that firms with high or extreme income-increasing 
AA  and  who  are  also  Democracy  firms  have  positive,  albeit  insignificant,  annualized 
abnormal return of 3.2 percent per year over 1991-2008. In addition, the portfolio of stocks 
with revelation of high or extreme income-increasing accruals in period t and experiences the 
greatest magnitude in accruals reversal in period t+1, and who are also Democracy firms, 
have positive annualized abnormal return of 10.8 percent. Unsurprisingly, firms with high or 
extreme  income-increasing  AA  with  Dictatorship  and  Drifter  governance  structures  have 12 
 
negative  abnormal  annualized  returns  of  0.9  and  7.5  percent  respectively,  which  are  as 
predicted by Sloan (1996). 
The viewpoint in Sloan (1996) that high accruals is associated with negative future 
stock returns has far-reaching consequences, suggesting that it may be necessary to limit 
managers‟ discretion with respect to accounting accruals, since investors cannot unravel the 
valuation effect of reported earnings in a timely manner under current reporting standards. 
Such an interpretation may be premature. My results raise doubts that investors respond in 
the same manner to abnormal accruals, since Democracy firms with high or extreme income-
increasing  AA  have  positive  future  returns.  This  suggests  two  things:  one,  the  level  of 
abnormal  accruals  is  a  coarse  measure  of  earnings  manipulation  for  these  set  of  firms, 
although it appears to remain a reasonable proxy of earnings management or EQ for firms 
with mixed or poor governance structures; and two, their shareholders benefit from “earnings 
management”  because  the  high  or  extreme  income-increasing  accruals  signals  future 
performance  (e.g.  Subramanyam,  1996;  Chanel  et  al,  1996).  The  evidence  helps  in  the 
understanding of investor behavior and whether the policy recommendations in Richardson, 
Sloan,  Soliman,  and  Tuna  (2005,  2006)  and  FASB  to  curtail  the  use  of  “less  reliable” 
components  of  accruals  are  appropriate,  especially  for  the  Democracy  firms.  If  the  joint 
interactive signal of governance and abnormal accruals can be a more informative measure of 
firm performance, reforms to limit managerial flexibility may be counterproductive. 
This  paper  can  be  viewed  as  an  attempt  to  integrate  two  streams  of  research  in 
financial accounting and finance. The first stream consists of a long string of papers, sparked 
by the influential GIM (2003), which examines the governance effects on firm performance. 
The second stream consists of valuation-oriented papers, since the seminal paper by Sloan 
(1996),  which  shows  that  accruals  predict  future  returns.  Overall,  the  results  in  the  two 
previously  unexamined  relationships  highlight  the  joint  importance  of  governance  and 13 
 
abnormal accruals in contributing to the total information environment to separate winners 
from losers.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and 
develops the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data, variable description and construction, 
and research methodology. Section 4 presents the empirical results, while Section 5 looks at 
the robustness test. Section 6 concludes. 
2.   Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
"If money is the blood and markets are the circulatory system of the global economy, then 
double-entry accounting ledgers are the nerve cells that control and respond to changes in 
the flow of money."  
- Gordon Gould (2000) on "Double-Entry Accounting" in the book “The Greatest Inventions 
of the Past 2,000 Years” which is edited by John Brockman who asked the world's leading 
thinkers to name the one invention that each thought made the greatest impact on civilization 
in the last 2,000 years.   
 
"Financial statements are a central feature of financial reporting  - a principal means of 
communicating financial information to those outside an entity"  
- FASB (1984), paragraph 5 
 
“Future research can also  contribute additional evidence to  further  identify and  explain 
which  types  of  accruals  are  used  for  earnings  management  and  which  are  not.  Future 
research is also needed to determine the conditions in which discretion in financial reporting 
is primarily used to improve communication vs. manage earnings.” 
- Healy and Whalen (1999), p368 
   
Agency costs, which result from the separation of management and financing, come 
in many guises. Managers may shirk or waste resources, invest extravagantly, build empires 
to the detriment of shareholders, and engage in self-dealing behavior such as  consuming 
perks and generating private benefits (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986; Djankov, La 
Porta, Silanes, Shleifer, 2008). Managers may also seek to entrench themselves by designing 
complex cross-ownership and holding structures with double voting rights that make it hard 
for outsiders to gain control (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Ang, Cole, and Lin, 2000; La Porta, 14 
 
Silanes,  Shleifer, and Vishny, 2000;  Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2010), or  by routinely 
resisting hostile takeovers, as these threaten their long-term positions (GIM, 2003; Bebchuk, 
Cohen, and Farrell, 2009).    
Information asymmetries between management and financiers create a demand for an 
internally generated measure which is an early or timely signal of firm performance to be 
reported for stewardship assessments that is not yet garbled by the future environmental noise 
that accrues after the signal is revealed but before the final outcome is realized. Financial 
accounting  information  is  an  important  source  of  information  and  firm  output  on  firm 
performance for ex ante resource allocation decisions. Standard setters define the accounting 
language that management uses to communicate with the firm's external stakeholders. By 
creating  a  framework  that  independent  auditors
1 and  the  SEC  can  enforce,  accounting 
standards can provide a relatively low -cost and credible means for corporate managers to 
report  information  on  their  firms'  performance  to  externa l  capital  providers  and  other 
stakeholders (Healy and Whalen, 1996). Ideally, financial reporting therefore helps the best -
performing firms (winners) in the economy to distinguish themselves from poor performers 
(losers) and facilitates efficient resource allocation and stewardship decisions by stakeholders.  
Over finite intervals, reporting realized cash flows is not necessarily informative 
because realized cash flows hav e timing and matching problems that cause them to be a 
“noisy”  measure  of  firm  performance.  Accounting  accruals,  guided  by  the  revenue 
recognition  and  matching  accounting  principles,  overcome  this  problem  that  comes  from 
measuring firm performance when firms are in continuous operations by altering the timing 
of cashflow recognition in earnings. Invented in 1494 by a Franciscan monk named Luca 
                                                           
1 The financial reporting industry is a huge and lucrative one. In Final Report of the Advisory Committee on the 
Auditing  Profession  to  the  U.S.  Department  of  Treasury  (2008), the first  major study of the U.S. auditing 
profession, it was reported that the four largest firms audit approximately 98% of the market capitalization of 
U.S. public companies. The Big 4 reported approximately $90 billion in total revenues. Total revenue reported 
by the U.S. affiliates of the Big 4 was $31.2 billion, of which approximately $11.8 billion (37.8%) was for 
audits of U.S. public companies. 15 
 
Pacioli,  accruals  accounting  was  designed  to  be  the  “nerve  cell”  to  help  the  flourishing 
Venetian  merchants  manage  their  burgeoning  economic  empires  and  to  serve  as  a 
communication  tool  with  external  parties.  Dechow  (1994)  provide  evidence  that  accrual 
accounting  earnings  are  superior  to  cash  accounting  earnings  at  summarizing  firm 
performance.  
Yet,  as  financial  accounting  information  is  a  managerial  output,  management  has 
discretion over the level of accruals (McNichols and Wilson, 1988). Since the seminal paper 
by Sloan (1996) documenting the influential result that high accruals are associated with 
negative future returns, most literature have held a scathing view on the role of accounting 
accruals as a discretionary device allowed under GAAP to give managers the flexibility to 
manage earnings opportunistically to entrench themselves (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989), either 
for career concerns (Murphy and Zimmerman, 1993; Pourciau, 1993; Smith, 1993; Farrell 
and  Whidbee,  2003)  or  for  compensation  reasons  (Matsunaga,  1995;  Balsam,  1998; 
Matsunaga  and  Park,  2001;  Bartov  and  Mohanram,  2004;  Cheng  and  Warfield,  2005; 
Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006; Burns and Kedia, 2006; Cornett et al, 2007), especially 
with popular anecdotes of earnings management in well-publicized accounting scandals such 
as Enron and WorldCom. Thus, while accrual accounting is superior to cash accounting in 
summarizing  performance,  the  accrual  component  of  earnings  should  receive  a  lower 
weighting than the cash component of earnings in evaluating firm performance, due to the 
greater subjectivity involved in the estimation of accruals. This interpretation was reinforced 
by an earlier paper by Dechow et al (1995) who carried out an ex post analysis of a sample of 
earnings  manipulations  subject  to  SEC  enforcement  actions  and  find  that  those  earnings 
manipulations are primarily attributable to accruals that reverse in the year following the 
earnings manipulations. As a result of this interpretation, the use of abnormal accruals as a 16 
 
proxy of earnings management or earning quality is prevalent in a long list of literature (for 
examples, see the survey paper on earnings quality by Dechow, Ge, and Schrand, 2009
2).  
However, accounting discretion in  accruals can be used by management, who have 
superior  information  about  their  firm‟s  cash  generating  ability,  to  signal  their  private 
information (Beaver et  al,  1989;  Wahlen, 1994;  Subramanyam, 1996;  Beaver  and Engel, 
1996; Arya et al, 2003; Louis and Robinson, 2005) to enhance credibility and reputation 
(Desai  et  al,  2006)  and  consistent  with  shareholders‟  wealth  maximization  as  efficient 
contracting would suggest (e.g. Malmquist, 1990). Also, earnings trend consistency is valued 
at a premium by the market (Barth, Elliott, and Finn, 1999), as is consistency in benchmark 
performance (Bartov et al, 2002; Kasznik and McNichols, 2002, Koonce and Lipe, 2010). 
Skinner  and  Sloan  (2002)  showed  that  when  a  firm‟s  earnings  fall  short  of  the  analyst 
consensus forecast by even a small amount, it triggers a large negative stock price reaction. In 
addition, managers can manage earnings to avoid violating accounting-based debt covenants 
that would otherwise increase the cost of capital for the firm (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986, 
1990; Smith, 1993; Sweeney, 1994). Managing earnings “appropriately” to smooth earnings
3 
                                                           
2 Some examples that use abnormal accruals as proxy of earnings quality or earnings management in various 
settings: (1) corporate governance e.g. Klein, 2002; Peasnell et al, 2005; Doyle, 2007; (2) audit and auditor e.g. 
Becker et al, 1998; DeFond and Subramanyam, 1998; Francis and Krishnan, 1999; Heninger, 2001; Bartov, Gul, 
and Tsui, 2001; DeFond and Park, 2001; Frankel, Johnson, and Nelson, 2002; Johnson et al, 2002; Chung and 
Kallapur, 2003; Gul et al, 2003; Butler et al, 2004; Larcker and Richardson, 2004; Menon and Williams, 2004; 
Srinidhi and Gul, 2007; Caramanis and Lennox, 2008; Francis and Wang, 2008; Caramanis and Lennox, 2008; 
(3) private equity/VC e.g. Katz, 2009; (4) ownership e.g. Haw et al, 2004; Warfield et al, 2005; Wang, 2006; 
Givoly, Hayn, and Katz, 2010; (5) insider trading e.g. Aboody, Hughes, and Liu, 2005; (6) IPO/SEO e.g. Teoh, 
Welch, and Wong, 1998a, 1998b; Shivakumar, 2000; Darrough and Ragan, 2005; Cohen, 2010; (7) regulatory 
e.g. Ashbaugh-Skaife et al 2008; Bartov and Cohen, 2009; Iliev, 2010; (8) disclosure e.g. Baber et al, 2006; 
Francis, Nanda, and Olsson, 2008; Levi, 2008; Louis et al, 2008; (9) corporate investments e.g. Biddle and 
Hilary, 2006; Biddle, Hillary, and Verdi, 2009; Beatty, Liao and Weber, 2010; (10) managerial compensation, 
turnover, and reputation e.g. Pourciau, 1993; Bartov and Mohanram, 2004; Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006; 
Geiger, 2006; Efendi et al, 2007; Cornett et al, 2007; Francis et al, 2008; Jiang, Petroni and Wang, 2010; (11) 
fraud, violation and restatements e.g. Beneish, 1997; Jones, Krishnan, and Melendrez, 2008; (12) benchmark 
performance e.g. Leone and Rock, 2002; Ayers, Jiang, and Yue, 2006; (13) international e.g. Pincus et al, 2007 
3 Some may not view the “appropriate” smoothing of earnings to be earnings management. For instance, former 
Microsoft  CFO  Greg  Maffei,  in  discussing  Microsoft‟s  revenue  deferral  practices  as  a  possible  earnings 
smoothing device, indicated “unearned revenue is not managed earnings in any way, shape, or form. It‟s quite 
the opposite. When people talk about managing earnings, they think you‟ve got some hidden pocket here or 
there… [but Microsoft‟s deferred revenue is] entirely visible. It goes in under a set of rules we proclaim to 
analysts”, as quoted in CFO, 8/1999 (Fink, 1999). 17 
 
can  “save”  current  earnings  for  possible  use  in  the  future  (DeFond  and  Park,  1997), 
increasing the informativeness of future earnings (Tucker and Zarowin, 2006); reduce the 
variability in reported earnings more when firms operate in high uncertainty (Ghosh and 
Olsen, 2009); and portray a less risky image of the firm (Gul  et al, 2003), reducing the 
perceived bankruptcy probability of the firm and, hence, the firm‟s borrowing cost (Trueman 
and Titman, 1988),  and these earnings  smoothing  actions  can be beneficial  to  the firm‟s 
shareholders (Goel and Thakor, 2003). Demski (1998) argued that managers communicate 
acquired expertise through earnings smoothing
4. Chaney, Jeter, and Lewis (1996) suggest that 
discretionary accruals smooth earnings and they interpret their findings as evidence that 
discretionary accruals are not opportunistic but that they communicate information about the 
firm‟s long-term (permanent) earnings to equity markets.  
Accounting accruals also serves as an input to help curb the agency problems, and to 
better governance structures and corporate control mechanisms to improve the productivity of 
investments (Bushman and Smith, 2001; Sloan, 2001). Accounting information can be used 
to indicate whether governance actions against management are required. For instance, the 
board uses accounting earnings performance as an input into their firing decisions (Weisbach, 
1988).  Managers  also  may  not  wish  to  inflate  accruals  since  they  are  associated  with 
heightened litigation risk (Dechow et al, 1996; DuCharme et al, 2004).  
                                                           
4 Different people know different things about an organization and nobody knows everything, a characteristic 
heightened  by  greater  uncertainty.  In  such  an  environment,  a  managed  earnings  stream  can  convey  more 
information than an unmanaged earnings stream (Arya et al, 2003). A smooth car ride is not only comfortable, 
but it also reassures the passenger about the driver‟s expertise. The key assumption is that a manager who works 
hard is both better able to run the firm and predict future earnings. The manager demonstrates his predictive 
powers, and hence his hard work, to the owner by smoothing earnings particularly under high uncertainty. 
Because earnings smoothing is an informative variable (the manager is better at it if he works than if he shirks), 
smoothing can reduce the cost of motivating the manager to work. Demski assumes what Sunder (1997) calls 
the “Conservation of Income”: the sum of accounting earnings over the firm‟s life is not affected by accounting 
choices (ignoring the effect of taxes and changes in the firm‟s opportunity set). Manipulation catches up with a 
manager. A feature of Demski‟s story is that smoothing is difficult. To smooth earnings well, the manager must 
be good at forecasting, and that requires hard work. If the manager can smooth earnings regardless of whether 
he works hard, then the owner is always better off contracting on unmanaged earnings. 18 
 
Still,  we  do  not  have  sufficient  and  conclusive  evidence  on  whether  managers 
exercise accounting discretion in an opportunistic or efficient manner (Dechow et al, 2009), 
which has been one of the long-standing questions of positive accounting research (Watts and 
Zimmerman,  1978,  1990).  There  is  a  missing  “deciphering  key”  that  does  not  allow  the 
contracting manager to describe ex ante the meaning of “good performance”; it is only later 
when the uncertainty unfolds that it becomes clearer what a good performance means.  If 
accounting discretion in reporting firm performance could be abused by managers to entrench 
themselves for job security or compensation reasons, then it is possible that the effectiveness 
of  internal  controls,  which  include  efficient  contracting  mechanisms  that  seek  to  align 
managerial interests with those of the shareholders, could curb these miscreant intentions. 
However, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) argued that: “In sum, internal control devices are not 
especially effective in forcing managers to abstain from non-value-maximizing conduct. In 
these  circumstances,  it  is  not  surprising  that  external  means  of  coercion  such  as  hostile 
takeovers can come to play a role.”  
Thus,  I argue that the missing “deciphering key” to  interpreting when accounting 
accruals are used opportunistically or efficiently by managers, and even shed light on Healy‟s 
(1996) unanswered question on “which types of accruals are used for earnings management 
and which are not”, is the governance structures of the firm. One potential measurement of 
the “external-based” governance that is in the spirit of Shleifer and Vishny (1988) is the G-
Index  in  GIM  (2003),  since  it  signals  entrenchment  via  anti-takeover  protections  against 
managerial  turnover.  Put  in  another  way,  variation  in  the  G-Index  is  correlated  with  the 
quality  of  mechanisms  (i.e.  the  external  market  discipline  imposed  on  managers  from 
potential  hostile  takeovers)  that  specifically  affect  earnings  management  opportunities  or 
incentives.   19 
 
Unsurprisingly, this is hardly a “new” idea. Dechow et al (1996) provide evidence on 
the  corporate  governance  structures  most  commonly  associated  with  the  earnings 
manipulations. Given an incentive to manipulate, they find that having a weak governance 
structure  is  more  likely  to  lead  to  the  firm  actively  engaging  in  earnings  management. 
Specifically, they document that firms subject to SEC enforcement actions are less likely to 
have an audit committee, more likely to have an insider-dominated board, more likely to have 
a CEO who is a company founder, and more likely to have a CEO who is Chairman of the 
board. Prior literature had also investigated the association between accounting discretion and 
governance, and interpreted a negative association as evidence of managerial opportunism 
(Becker,  DeFond,  Jiambalvo,  and  Subramanyam  1998;  Gaver,  Gaver,  and  Austin,  1995; 
Chen and Lee 1995; Guidry, Leone, and Rock, 1999; Healy, 1999; Frankel, Johnson, and 
Nelson 2002; Klein 2002; Menon and Williams, 2004; Peasnell et al, 2005). Garcí a, Garcí a, 
and Penalva (2009) find a positive association between commonly used governance proxies 
for effective monitoring and timely loss recognition. However, all of these studies do not 
show  that  (less)  excess  accounting  discretion  has  (positive)  negative  consequences  for 
shareholders‟  wealth,  or  even  the  possibility  that  excess  discretion  can  have  positive 
shareholders‟ wealth effects.  
In one of the early important study by Christie and Zimmerman (1994), they assume 
that the takeover market would discipline opportunism and use this to identify a sample of 
firms  that  are  likely  to  be  opportunistic.  They  do  not  find  evidence  of  accounting 
opportunism, thus discounting the Opportunistic Hypothesis and bending towards efficiency 
explanations. In a recent important update of the efficiency view using an interesting research 
methodology,  Bowen  et  al  (2008)  find  that  managers  do  not  systematically  exploit  poor 
governance  to  use  accounting  discretion  for  opportunistic  purposes;  in  fact,  accounting 
discretion  is  used  to  increase  shareholder  wealth,  consistent  with  efficient  contracting 20 
 
motivations. Their conclusion was based upon their interpretation of the evidence, uncovered 
in  a  two-stage  regression  model,  of  a  positive  association  between  predicted  excess 
accounting discretion due to  governance (or the portion  of accruals  associated with  poor 
governance in the first-stage regression) and subsequent performance as measured by future 
cash flow from operation and return on assets, in contrast to the findings in prior literature. In 
other words, greater accounting discretion is not associated with poor firm performance. Thus, 
the  study  by  Bowen  et  al  (2008)  was  the  first  to  go  a  step  further  to  document  the 
consequences of excess accounting discretion that is due to poor governance on subsequent 
firm operating performance. 
I  argue  that  these  studies,  whether  in  favor  of  the  Opportunistic  or  Performance 
Management  (or  Efficient  Contracting)  story,  have  two  limitations.  Firstly,  with  the 
exception of the recent paper by Garcia et al (2009), most, if not all, of the studies in the past 
had  concentrated  on  or  were  seduced  by  the  “dark  side”  of  the  governance,  that  is,  the 
association between accounting discretion and  poor governance (and its consequences on 
subsequent firm performance as examined in Bowen et al, 2008), but missed out on exploring 
the “light side”, that is, the discretionary actions undertaken by the efficient managers when 
connected  to  the  good  governance  mechanism,  and  the  consequent  implications  on 
shareholders‟ wealth. Secondly, and surprisingly, none of the studies thus far had investigated 
the  possibility  of  how  accounting  accruals  discretion  and  governance  can  interactively 
combine to become a more informative unique signal, beyond what each signal can reveal 
individually, to impact shareholders‟ wealth. This latter point will be elaborated upon in the 
next paragraphs to lead to the main hypotheses of the paper. An interpretation and conclusion 
on whether there is managerial opportunism or efficiency from accounting discretion will be 
incomplete and premature without addressing these two concerns. 21 
 
Financial  accounting  information  is  an  output  produced  by  management.  This 
suggests that the presence and input of good governance structures, which mitigate agency 
costs and shown to be important in determining firm value in the influential paper by GIM 
(2003), are necessary to ensure that the accounting information supplied by management is 
not opportunistically manipulated in response to a variety of incentives. Signals produced by 
management can therefore be reliably assessed by external parties. The output of earnings 
quality (EQ), in turn, serve as an input to better governance structures and corporate control 
mechanisms  to  improve  the  productivity  of  investments  through  three  channels:  one,  by 
increasing the efficiency with which the assets in place are managed (governance channel); 
two,  by  reducing  the  error  with  which  managers  identify  good  versus  bad  investments 
(project identification); and three, by reducing the information asymmetries among investors 
and the expropriation of investors‟ wealth (adverse selection) (Bushman and Smith, 2001; 
Sloan, 2001).  Bushman et al (2004) also document an inverse association between measures 
of the informativeness of accounting numbers and governance. In particular, they posit that 
firms that produce accounting information of limited transparency place a higher burden in 
governance structures to overcome this shortcoming.  
Thus, it is clear that corporate governance and financial accounting are inexorably 
linked through a  complementarity relationship.  Complementarity,  as  pointed out  by  Ball, 
Jayaraman and Shivakumar (2010), implies that “financial reporting usefulness depends on 
its  contribution  to  the  total  information  environment,  whereas  substitutability  implies 
usefulness depends on the new information it releases on a stand-alone basis.” Thus, both 
governance and accruals information are jointly informative; each may contain information 
not contained in the other about the future prospects of the firm. Importantly, this suggests 
the possibility of two previously unexamined relationships that will be developed into three 
main hypotheses.  22 
 
Firstly, I posit that governance could be overrated without Low AA as an input. The 
results  in  GIM  (2003)  indicate  that  the  hedge  portfolio  of  buying  firms  with  strong 
governance  (Democracy),  and  selling  firms  with  weak  governance  (Dictatorship),  can 
generate significant long-term abnormal return of 8.5 percent per year over the sample period 
from September 1990 to December 1999. The hedge return are asymmetrically positioned, 
with 3.5 (5.0) percent from the long (short) position of the Democracy (Dictatorship) firms. 
In  particular,  I  argue  that  it  is  possible  that  the  good  governance  associated  with  future 
positive abnormal stock returns could be attenuated when the subset of Democracy firms with 
Low AA is removed. Thus, good governance per se does not lead to future positive abnormal 
return, contrary to the findings in GIM (2003). In other words, good governance on a stand-
alone basis no longer pays off.  Isolating the  Democracy firms  with Low AA should also 
enhance significantly the governance effects on future positive abnormal return. Moreover, 
the positive abnormal return for the Democracy-Low AA firms should be significantly larger 
than those of the unconditional Low AA (Democracy) firms, which indicate an incremental 
value  in  the  governance  (Low  AA)  signal,  lending  further  weight  to  the  intuition  that 
corporate  governance  and  abnormal  accruals  are  inexorably  linked  through  a 
complementarity  relationship.  In  addition,  mixed  governance  (termed  Drifter)  and 
Dictatorship firms with Low AA should have positive abnormal return. Thus, Hypothesis 1, 
stated in its alternative form, is as follow: 
H1a: Good  governance  (Democracy)  without  being  accompanied  by  Low  AA  is  not 
associated with positive abnormal return. 
H1b: Democracy  accompanied  by  Low  AA  is  associated  with  highly  significant  positive 
abnormal return. 
H1c: Democracy  accompanied  by  Low  AA  have  larger  positive  abnormal  return  as 
compared  to  the  unconditional  Low  AA  (Democracy)  firms,  highlighting  the 
incremental value in the good governance (Low AA) signal; corporate governance and 
abnormal accruals are inexorably linked through a complementarity relationship. 
H1d: Mixed governance (Drifter) and poor governance (Dictatorship) accompanied by Low 
AA are associated with positive abnormal return. 23 
 
Of great interest and debate in the literature is the question of whether investors are 
able to “see through” transitory distortions in accrual accounting numbers. The explanation 
by Sloan is that investors are thought to be overly-fixated on earnings (the Earnings-Fixation 
Hypothesis),  misinterpreting  the  transitory  nature  of  the  accruals  information,  only  to  be 
systematically  surprised  when  accruals  turn  out,  in  the  future,  to  be  less  persistent  than 
cashflows.  Consequently,  abnormal  stock  returns  result  as  corrections  to  the  initial 
overreaction in the year immediately following extreme accruals. Thus, Sloan views future 
reversals to be a result of aggressive or “bad” accounting that originally inflate accruals. 
Accordingly, a hedge portfolio that buys (sells) firms with low (high) accruals can generate 
abnormal return of 10.4 percent, with 4.9 (5.5) percent from the long (short) position in the 
subsequent year. Further evidence by Xie (2001), DeFond and Park (2001) and Chan, Chan, 
Jegadeesh,  and  Lakonishok  (2006)  indicate  that  this  “accruals  anomaly”  is  related  to 
abnormal, or sometimes called discretionary, accruals
5. They argue that certain discretionary 
actions on the part of managers induce a transitory element to accruals, with stronger mean -
reverting tendency of discretionary accruals, defined using the Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney 
(1996) modified Jones model, leading to an overpricing of aggregate accruals.  
However,  a  limitation  of  Sloan‟s  study  is  that  the  returns  predictability  could  be 
attributed to unidentified risk factors that is correlated with accruals or unknown research 
design  flaws  (Kothari,  2001).  Healy  (1996)  pointed  out  that  one  major  deficiency  is  the 
inability of these accruals model to “adequately incorporate the effect of changes in business 
fundamentals”. Healy added that  since the residual  accruals  estimated by accruals  model 
                                                           
5 The size and persistence of these abnormal returns from accruals is “pervasive” and generally considered one 
of the most compelling pieces of evidence against market efficiency (Fama and French, 2008). BusinessWeek in 
1/07 reported that “Earnings quality has been Barclays Global Investors‟ (BGI) single largest source of alpha 
over  the  last  decade”.  In  the  forthcoming  Journal  of  Accounting  &  Economics  survey  paper  “Accounting 
Anomalies and Fundamental Analysis: A Review of Recent Research Advances” by Richardson, Tuna and 
Wysocki  (2009),  eight  (two)  out  of  the  top  ten  papers  on  anomalies  and  fundamental  analysis  that  were 
published in accounting (all) top-tier journals with the highest average citations per year since 1995 relate to the 
accruals anomaly. 24 
 
could arise due to changes in business fundamentals and because of ex post management 
forecast  errors,  and  the  models  are  accrual  expectations  models  rather  than  models  of 
discretionary accruals, he would change the label from “discretionary” to “abnormal” if he 
were to rewrite his influential paper (1985) about the opportunistic behavior of managers. 
Healy and Whalen (1999) also highlighted their inadequacy to “further identify and explain 
which types of accruals are used for earnings management and which are not”. 
Therefore, and secondly, I argue that the conventional interpretation of EQ, measured 
by the magnitude of abnormal accruals, could vary across governance structures. The noise 
and uncertainty associated with the abnormal accruals signal - that is, managerial discretion 
could be interpreted as either opportunistic or conveying credible private signal about firm 
performance  -  is  interactively  resolved  with  information  about  the  firm‟s  governance 
structure, and the unique pairing of the signals contains unique information about the future 
prospects of the firm. Abnormal accruals, when accompanied by good governance, become 
more informative and the interactive combined signal  corroborates with  the  Performance 
Management Hypothesis. In particular, firms with high or extreme income-increasing AA, 
usually  interpreted  as  engaging  in  earnings  management,  will  not  have  negative  future 
abnormal return if they happen to be also Democracy firms, contrary to the predictions in 
Sloan (1996). Firms  with  high or  extreme income-increasing  AA, when accompanied by 
Dictatorship and Drifter governance structures, have negative future stock returns, consistent 
with Sloan‟s predictions. Thus, Hypothesis 2, stated in its alternative form, is as follow: 
H2a: High AA accompanied by good governance (Democracy) are associated with positive 
future abnormal return.  
H2b:Low AA accompanied by mixed governance (Drifter) or poor governance (Dictatorship) 
are associated with negative future abnormal return. 
  
Thus,  the  predicted  associations  from  the  two  hypotheses  are  summarized  in  the 
below diagram for ease of reference in subsequent discussion and analyses. The signs in the 25 
 
table denote the direction of the association with future abnormal return; while the number of 
signs indicates the magnitude and significance of the abnormal return, where two positive 
(negative) signs denote highly positive (negative) future returns. I make no predictions on the 
direction of the associations for the firms with mixed AA.   
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The evidence from H2 if rejected in its null form will be strengthened in an additional 
test if there is evidence as follow: when the portfolio of firms with revelation of high or 
extreme income-increasing accruals in period t experiences the biggest magnitude in accruals 
reversal  in  period  t+1,  those  who  are  also  Democracy  firms  will  have  positive  future 
abnormal return, not negative return as was predicted under Sloan‟s hypothesis. The trend of 
reported  earnings  and  the  subsequent  accruals  reversals  at  these  firms  are  interpreted  as 
credible private signals of firm performance by the managers, resulting in larger positive 
future stock returns, as  it has  been shown that  earnings  trend  consistency is  valued at  a 
premium  by  the  market  (Barth,  Elliott,  and  Finn,  1999),  as  is  consistency  in  benchmark 
performance (Bartov et al, 2002; Kasznik and McNichols, 2002; Koonce and Lipe, 2010). 
Thus, Hypothesis 3, stated in its alternative form, is as follow: 
H3:  Good  governance  (Democracy)  firms  with  revelation  of  high  or  extreme  income-
increasing abnormal accruals in period t that experiences the biggest magnitude in 
accruals reversal in period t+1 are associated with positive future abnormal return. 
 
Recently, and increasingly, the results in GIM (2003) are being challenged as artifacts 
of either asset pricing model misspecification or unexpected industry performance, and the 
excess  returns  were  not  significantly  different  from  zero  after  controlling  for  industry 
clustering effects (Johnson, Moorman, and Sorescu, 2009). Core, Guay, and Rusticus (2006) 26 
 
find  that  neither  analysts  nor  investors  were  surprised  by  differences  in  operating 
performance across Democracy or Dictatorship firms, and resolve the puzzle of apparent 
nonzero long-term abnormal return in the absence of firm-specific surprises. Core et al (2006) 
also showed that the relative performance of good and bad governance portfolios reverses 
following the GIM sample period with the good governance portfolio underperforming the 
bad  governance  portfolio  over  the  period  2000-2003.  Bebchuk,  Cohen  and  Wang  (2010) 
showed that the abnormal return associated with the G-Index during the post-GIM period of 
2000-2008 had disappeared. Bebchuk et al (2010) argued that this result could be due to 
market participants‟ learning to appreciate the difference between firms scoring well and 
poorly on the governance indices after the publication of the results in GIM. Cremers and 
Nair  (2005)  examined  how  the  simultaneous  consideration  of  two  different  governance 
mechanisms  –  takeover  vulnerability  and  shareholder  activism  –  is  crucial  for  the 
documented  abnormal  return  in  GIM  (2003);  they  found  that  the  portfolio  that  buys 
Democracy firms and shorts Dictatorship firms generates abnormal return only when public 
pension fund (blockholder) ownership is high as well. In addition, prominent commercial 
governance ratings are found to have limited or no success in predicting firm performance, 
restatements, security litigation and other outcomes of interest to shareholders (Daines, Gow, 
and Larcker, 2010). Until GIM (2003), literature on individual governance characteristics had 
not  identified  a  conclusive  systematic  relation  to  firm  performance,  and  these  recent 
observations  reflect  the  extreme  difficulty  in  distilling  all  of  the  complex  governance 
mechanisms into a single, integrated, yet informative overall score, with econometrics issues 
of governance as an endogenous firm choice, correlated omitted variables and measurement 
errors  complicating  the  relationship  (Larcker,  Richardson,  and  Tuna,  2007;  Larcker  and 
Rusticus, 2010). 27 
 
This paper is the first, to the best of my knowledge, to attempt to empirically resolve 
this  long-standing  tense  debate  regarding  the  relationship  between  governance  and  firm 
performance, and show that both the supporters and the sceptics of the results in GIM (2003) 
are not incorrect by pointing out that this “performance gap” in governance can be closed by 
extending  the  analysis  beyond  using  corporate  governance  rating  on  a  stand-alone  basis, 
particularly by considering the interactive effects of abnormal accruals and governance which 
yield a more informative combined private signal about firm value.  
The  observant  reader  will  notice  that  there  is  a  striking  similarity  with  both  the 
governance  and  accruals  trading  strategy  in  GIM  (2003)  and  Sloan  (1996).  Both  of  the 
documented abnormal returns are concentrated on the short side. Without an economically 
significant  positive  return  to  the  long  position  in  the  Democracy  and  extreme  income-
decreasing  accruals  portfolio,  it  is  possible  that  the  hedge  returns  no  longer  exceeds 
transaction costs, especially given the high transaction costs, limits to arbitrage and short-
selling constraints associated with taking a short position (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Jones 
and Lamont, 2002; Boehmer et al, 2009). University of Notre Dame professor of finance Tim 
Loughran commented in the CFA Digest that he is “always suspicious of anomalies that seem 
to be focused on the short side” (Trammell, 2010). Loughran related how he wanted to short 
Krispy Kreme, but was told by his broker that it is not possible because “every single share 
that‟s available to be shorted has been shorted”. In addition, it appears that the predictive 
returns from employing the accruals strategy is dissipating, as what Ron Kahn,  Barclays 
Global Investors (BGI) then global head of research, stated in Financial Times in 1/2009 that 
“buying companies with high quality earnings and shorting those most dependent on accruals 
proved a good strategy, until the market figured it out” (Skypala, 2009). Green, Hand, and 
Soliman (2009) extended the time period five years beyond the 2003 endpoint used by Lev 
and Nissim (2006) and Mashruwala et al (2006) and found that abnormal accruals is no 28 
 
longer  an  effective  predictor  of  future  stock  returns  because  the  anomalous  returns  are 
arbitraged away by hedge fund investors deploying greater capital, an estimated peak dollar 
investments of almost $60 billion in 2007, in exploiting this signal to the point that they are 
no longer positive. Thus, a firm with Low AA may even have poor future stock performance if 
too many investors crowd around a similar trading strategy of buying firms with Low AA. 
Therefore,  this  paper  also  restores  the  viability  of  both  investment  strategies  by 
documenting how the long position in Democracy firms with Low AA – the Super-Performers 
- generates abnormal annualized return of 10.5 percent over 1991-2008, well in excess of 
possible transaction costs. 
3.  Data, Variable Description, and Research Methodology 
3.1   Measure of governance and abnormal stock returns 
The data for this study is drawn from the eight volumes published by the Investor 
Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) that have a governance index score (G-Index) and 
financial and stock price data from CRSP/Compustat Merged database (CCM) and CRSP 
database  respectively.  The  G-Index  is  based  on  24  IRRC  provisions  which  restrict 
shareholder rights, and a higher score is viewed as representing poorer governance. The score 
of the G-Index ranges from 1 to 24, and GIM (2003) classified companies with G-Index less 
than or equal to 5 as the „Democracy’ portfolio, while those with a score of 14 and above are 
classified as „Dictatorship’ portfolio. The volumes were published on the following dates: 
September  1990,  July  1993,  July  1995,  February  1998,  November  1999,  February  2002, 
January 2004, and January 2006. The data in the 2008 RiskMetrics governance volume was 
not used because it is not comparable with data in the earlier IRRC volumes
6. Following GIM 
(2003) and subsequent literature, I exclude dual-class firms because of the unique governance 
                                                           
6 In 2007, RiskMetrics acquired IRRC and revamped its data collection methods; consequently, changes were 
made both in the set of provisions covered and in the definitions of some of the covered provisions. For example, 
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structures and regulations prevailing for these sets of firms. Following this, the number of 
firms (at each publication date) is as follows: 1,303 (1990), 1,303 (1993), 1,333 (1995), 1,642 
(1998), 1,492 (2000), 1,588 (2002), 1,675 (2004), 1,619 (2006). An annual time series of the 
G-Index is constructed using the forward-fill method of GIM (2003) by assuming that the 
governance provisions remain unchanged from the current date of on volume until the current 
date of the next volume. Given the relatively stability of G-Index over time, GIM (2003) 
argue that any measurement noise using the forward-fill method is likely to be relatively 
minor. Data in the last IRRC volume of 2006 are filled to the end of 2008. Thus, the sample 
period in  this  study is  from  September 1991 to  December 2008. Each firm‟s G-index is 
matched with its monthly returns (including dividends) from CRSP, and a value-weighted 
portfolio  is  constructed.  Portfolios  are  rebalanced  at  the  beginning  of  each  month  and 
governance data is updated whenever information in a new IRRC volume becomes available. 
Abnormal stock returns is captured by the estimated intercept, “alpha”, using Fama-
French (1993) three-factor model and includes the Carhart (1997) momentum factor UMD 
calculated  from  WRDS
7. For each calendar month, the  value-weighted average return to 
portfolios of firms grouped into deciles of portfolios  sorted by the G-Index is calculated, 
according to the most recent value of the G-Index. The excess monthly returns are regressed 
on the four factors as mentioned:  
Rt = α + β1RMRFt + β2SMBt + β3HMLt + β4UMDt + εt           (1) 
where Rt is the return of the governance portfolio in excess of the risk-free rate (one-month 
Treasury bill) in month t, or (Ri – Rf)t; RMRFt is the month t value-weighted market return 
minus the risk-free rate, and the terms SMBt (small minus big), HMLt (high minus low), and 
                                                           
7 Fama and French (1996) find that many of the anomalies identified in the past largely disappear when their 
three-factor model in Fama and French (1993) is used to examine them. Kothari (2001) commented that the 
measurement problem of long-horizon performance measurement is exacerbated when the cumulation period is 
extended.  Kothari  (2001)  argues  that  regardless  of  whether  the  models  by  Fama  and  French  (1993)  are 
empirically motivated, it is important to control for factors identified in their models to determine whether the 
treatment variable or event is generating the abnormal returns. 30 
 
UMDt are the month t returns on zero-investment factor-mimicking portfolios designed to 
capture  size,  book-to-market,  and  momentum  effects,  respectively.  Thus,  the  estimated 
intercept α is the abnormal return in excess of what could have been achieved by passive 
investments in the factors
8.  
Following GIM (2003), I replicate their  main results in Table VI  using their four-
factor calendar time portfolio method using equity returns from September 1991 to December 
1999
9. My results are similar and are not presented. The results in  GIM (2003) revealed that 
the positive monthly alpha for the Democracy portfolio, the group of firms with a G-Index of 
5 or less, is a statistically significant 0.29 percent. The portfolios with G-Index of 6 and 7 also 
generate qualitatively similar positive monthly alpha of 0.22 and 0.24 percent respectively, 
albeit statistically insignificant.  Given that the original Democracy portfolio comprise of 
only around 9 percent of the sample data on average, and that it is highly likely that there will 
be heightened attention on corporate governance in the post-GIM sample period, I extended 
the sample size of the  Democracy  portfolio by  including firms  with  qualitatively similar 
positive monthly alphas and re-grouping the Democracy portfolio as firms with a G-Index 
score of 7 or less. Following this, Democracy firms now comprise 27.9 percent of the sample 
on average. Importantly, as one of my key tests is to examine whether isolating Democracy 
firms  with  Low  Abnormal  Accruals  (AA)  as  an  input  will  enhance  significantly  the 
governance effects on returns (H1b), such a re-classification is biased against my findings. In 
addition, I wish to show that Drifter and Dictatorship can have positive abnormal return as 
well (H1c), and such  re-grouping  will again  be biased  against my  results.  Likewise, the 
                                                           
8 As pointed out by prior studies (e.g. Fama and French, 1993; Carhart, 1997; Larcker et al, 2005, 2007), since 
the dependent variable is excess returns, the benchmark returns are already included in the computation and 
additional control variables are not included.  
9 In the original GIM (2003), the authors calculated their momentum returns themselves using the procedures of 
Carhart (1997). It has been found in subsequent studies (e.g. Johnson, Moorman, and Sorescu, 2009) that the 
results were highly sensitive to the use of either the Carhart‟s PY1YR factor or Ken French‟s UMD factor to 
compute the momentum returns. Specifically, the hedged Democracy-Dictatorship portfolio returns were either 
reduced or rendered statistically insignificant when the UMD factor is used. Again, to be conservative, I use the 
factor UMD that is biased against my findings.   31 
 
negative monthly alpha for the Dictatorship portfolio, the group of firms with a G-Index of 
14 and above and comprising 5.5 percent of the sample on average in GIM (2003), is a 
statistically  significant  0.42  percent;  those  with  G-Index  of  13  and  12 have  qualitatively 
similar negative monthly alpha at 0.01 and 0.25 respectively.  In the same fashion, I re-
classified  firms  with  a  G-Index  of  12  and  above  as  Dictatorship,  now  comprising  20.0 
percent of the sample on average. Firms with a G-Index between 8 and 11 comprise 52.1 
percent  of  the  sample  on  average,  and  they  are  termed  Drifter.  GIM  (2003)  and  all  the 
subsequent literature on governance made no mention about these Drifter firms even though 
they are the bulk of the sample size. The properties of the Drifter are deliberately examined 
to test whether Drifter with Low AA can also enjoy a valuation premium with positive future 
abnormal return just like the Democracy firms (H1d).   
3.2  Measures of earnings quality 
There is no one measure of  earnings quality (EQ), a multi-faceted term, which is 
universally agreed upon (Dechow, Schrand and Ge, 2009). The EQ measures are selected 
based on the measures‟ value relevance – the ability to explain variation in contemporaneous 
stock  returns  –  because  value  relevance  is  generally  viewed  in  the  literature  as  a  direct 
estimate of the measure‟s usefulness in equity investors‟ decision making (e.g. Collins et al, 
1997; Francis and Schipper, 1999; Lev and Zarowin, 1999; Barton, Hansen and Pownall, 
2010).  Moreover,  the  FASB  considers  “relevance”  as  a  primary  quality  that  makes 
accounting information useful to investors (FASB, 1980; Barth, Beaver and Landsman, 2001; 
Holthausen and Watts, 2001). Below is a description of the two models of EQ that were 
considered. 
3.2.1  Abnormal accruals in Dechow and Dichev (2002) model   
The  use  of  the  Dechow  and  Dichev  (2002)  model  has  become  the  accepted 
methodology  in  accounting  to  capture  discretion  (e.g.  Francis  et  al,  2005;  Dechow,  Ge, 32 
 
Schrand, 2010). Dechow and Dichev derived working capital accrual quality based on the 
following firm-level time-series regression
10:  
∆WC = β0 + β1CFOt-1 + β2CFOt + β3CFOt+1 + εt             (2) 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) took the position that earnings mapping more closely to 
operating  cash  flows  is  of  higher  quality.  The  residuals  from  the  regression  reflect  the 
accruals that are unrelated to cash flow realizations. The magnitude of these residuals is a 
firm-year measure of accruals quality, where higher value of the residuals denotes lower 
quality
11. The underlying assumption is that if a performance measure is closer to the firm‟s 
cash flows, then accrual accounting – and therefore managers‟ judgments and estimates – will 
have less of an effect on the reported performance measures. The measure attempts to isolate 
the managed or error component of accruals. Measures that are closer to operating cashflows 
have  greater value relevance.  The Dechow and  Dichev (2002) model  appears to  provide 
better estimates of abnormal accruals than other models, and it has much higher explanatory 
power than the modified Jones model (and its various extensions) and much lower variability 
in the error term. Jones et al (2008) provide evidence indicating superiority of the Dechow 
and Dichev (2002) model over competing models. Specifically, they show that this model 
exhibits the strongest association with the existence and magnitude of fraud and non-fraud 
restatements, and therefore performs better than other models in estimating abnormal accruals. 
The CFO (Compustat item OANCF) is derived from the Statement of Cash Flows 
reported  under  the  Statement  of  Financial  Accounting  Standards  No.  95  (SFAS  No.  95, 
                                                           
10 Consistent with prior literature (e.g. Francis et al, 2005) and throughout this section in the computation of the 
measures of earnings quality as proxied by abnormal accruals, I winsorize the extreme values of the distribution 
of each variable in the regression model to the 1 and 99 percentiles to ensure that the results are not driven by 
outliers. 
11 Hribar and Nichols (2007) pointed out using unsigned or absolute abnormal accruals as a measure of earnings 
management will increase the expected value of absolute abnormal accruals due to a lack of fit in the estimation 
of abnormal accruals, and hence can bias tests in favor of rejecting the null hypothesis of  earnings management. 
They propose the use of signed abnormal accruals as a more conservative test of earnings management, where 
significant results are obtained in spite of the noise in the estimation of abnormal accruals. Dechow and Ge 
(2006) also commented that the sign of the accruals is important: “earnings persistence is affected by both the 
magnitude and sign of accruals.” 33 
 
FASB 1987), given the results in Collins and Hribar (2002) showing that the balance-sheet 
approach to deriving CFO leads to noisy and biased estimates. The change in working capital 
from year t-1 to t (∆WC) is computed as ∆AR + ∆Inventory - ∆AP - ∆TP + ∆Other Assets 
(net), where AR is accounts receivables, AP is accounts payable, and TP is taxes payable. 
Specifically, ∆WC is calculated from Compustat items as ∆WC = - (RECCH + INVCH + 
APALCH + TXACH + AOLOCH). All variables are scaled by average total assets. Following 
Dechow and Dichev (2002), I replicate their main findings in Table 3 and Table 4 using data 
from their sample period of 1987-1999. My results are very similar and are not presented. 
Ten  decile  portfolios  sorted  and  ranked  by  the  magnitude  of  the  residuals  in  the 
regression model in (2) are formed three months after the end of each fiscal year to ensure 
that the financial statements are publicly available
12. The portfolio of  firm-months with the 
lowest (highest)  value in residuals is given an  abnormal accruals (AA)  score of 1 (10).  
Similar to the approach used in sorting the firms into the three categories of governance 
structures, the group of firms with a score of 3 and below is re-classified as “Low or Income-
Decreasing AA”; those with a score between 4 and 7 are classified as “Mixed AA”; and 
finally, those with a score of 8 and above are classified as “High or Income-Increasing AA”.  
3.2.2  Abnormal accruals in the modified Jones model by Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney 
(1996) 
                                                           
12 Alford and Zmijewski (1994) report that there is violation and extension of the mandatory SEC Form 10-K 
filing requirement for around 20 percent of their sample over the period 1978-1985, and prior studies such as 
Sloan (1996) ranked their sample firms into deciles based on the magnitude of their scaled abnormal accruals 
four months after the fiscal year end, arguing that by this time, almost all firms‟ financial statements are publicly 
available. However, as pointed out by Green, Hand, and Soliman (2009), it is increasingly common for firms to 
voluntarily report both earnings and cash flows at their quarterly and annual earnings announcements, well prior 
to the mandatory 10-Q and 10-K filing dates. Real-time data providers such as Compustat and FactSet have also 
increased the amount of detailed information they provide to their clients and the speed at which they provide it. 
With this contemporary view, Green et al (2009) used three months after the fiscal year end to do their ranking. 
As a robustness check, I find that my results are not quantitatively or qualitatively affected when I use four 
months after the fiscal year end in the ranking exercise; in fact, some of the key results are stronger and I report 
the more conservative set of results.    34 
 
In the original Jones (1991) model, total accruals and working capital accruals are 
explained as a function of sales growth (Compustat item change in REVT) and plant, property 
& equipment (PPEGT) respectively, and all variables are scaled by lagged total assets. The 
modified Jones model by Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) is adjusted for growth in credit 
sales (Compustat item change in RECT), which are frequently manipulated: 
TACCt = α + β1(∆REVTt - ∆RECTt)+ β2PPEGTt + + εt           (3) 
The power of the Jones‟ model is increased by this modification, yielding a residual 
that is uncorrelated with expected (i.e. normal) revenue accruals and better reflects revenue 
manipulation
13.  TACC is computed as change in current assets (Compustat item change in 
ACT), minus change in current liabilities (Compustat item change in LCT), minus change in 
cash (Compustat item change in CH), plus change in short-term debt (Compustat item change 
in DLC), minus depreciation (Compustat item DEPN)
14. The approach used in sorting and 
ranking the residuals in the modified Jones model in equation (3) and re-classifying the firm-
months into the three categories of  AA is similar to that  as described for the Dechow and 
Dichev (2002) model in Section 3.2.1.  
3.3     Measures of accruals reversal 
                                                           
13 Collins and Hribar (2002) use an alternative measure of accruals that is based on the statement of cash flows, 
rather  than  from  the  balance  sheet  approach  advocated  in  Sloan  (1996).  They  argue  that  firms  that  have 
undergone a merger and acquisition (or divestiture) are more likely to have high (or low) accruals. Since the 
subsequent stock returns of firms involved in M&As tend to be below average, high accruals may be associated 
with poor future returns. They term this as the “non-articulation problem”. Ball and Shivakumar (2008) argued 
forcefully that the results in Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998a, 1998b) are due to this non-articulation problem, 
and doubt the use of abnormal accruals in studies that involve large transactional events, such as an IPO/SEO. 
My study does not involve the setting of examining earnings quality around a major transactional event. Further 
robustness checks using the cash flow approach advocated by Collins and Hribar (2002) does not affect my 
results qualitatively as well. 
14 Instead of TACC, some studies use WACC, or working capital accrual, which is computed without subtracting 
depreciation. As pointed out by Richardson et al (2005), there is considerable subjectivity involved in selecting 
an amortization schedule for PP&E. The depreciation/amortization method, the useful life, and the salvage value 
are all subjective decisions that impact this accrual category. PP&E are subject to periodic write-downs when 
they are determined to have been impaired. The estimation of the amount of these impairments involves great 
subjectivity. For example, the well publicized accounting scandal at WorldCom involved billions of dollars of 
operating costs that were aggressively capitalized as PP&E. I find that my results are not affected qualitatively 
from using TACC or WACC, and I report TACC in the empirical results in Section 4 for the reasons highlighted 
above and for comparability with other studies which mostly use TACC (e.g. see the comprehensive survey by 
Dechow et al, 2009). 35 
 
Following Allen, Larson, and Sloan (2010), I define accruals reversal (ACCREVt+1) as 
the difference between accruals in the current period and accruals in the previous period, with 
the accruals being estimated as either ∆WC in equation (2) in the Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
model, or TACC in equation (3) in the modified Jones model. The implicit assumption in this 
definition  is  that  accruals  are  expected  to  reverse  within  the  next  year  as  has  been 
documented empirically in  many studies (e.g.  Sloan, 1996;  Bradshaw  et  al,  2001)
15.  For 
instance, a negative accruals reversal involves the revelation of  high or  extreme income-
increasing accruals (e.g. boosting inventory accruals) in period t – conventionally interpreted 
as evidence of earnings management or poor EQ – and the reversal into negative accruals (e.g. 
inventory writedown) in period t+1. The magnitude of ACCREVt+1 is sorted and ranked to 
form ten decile portfolios three months after the end of each fiscal year, and then matched 
with the monthly CRSP returns in period t+1. Again, a similar approach as described in the 
earlier sections is used to re-classify the ten portfolios into three portfolio categories: big net 
negative  accruals  reversal  (Negative  Accruals  Reversal),  mixed  accruals  reversal  (Mixed 
Accruals Reversal), and big net positive accruals reversal (Positive Accruals Reversal). I am 
particularly interested in testing the hypothesis, stated in its alternative form, of whether the 
abnormal  return  or  monthly  alpha  in  the  association  between  both  positive  and  negative 
accruals  reversal  and  future  stock  returns  is  significantly  positive  (H3),  contrary  to  the 
negative returns in Sloan‟s view. 
4.   Empirical Results  
4.1  Summary statistics 
  Before examining the returns on the stocks sorted two-dimensionally by governance 
and abnormal accruals (AA) to test out the three key hypotheses highlighted in the previous 
                                                           
15 Allen et al (2010) further argued that their use of current accruals in their empirical analysis can help them to 
mitigate concerns about loss of power from the omission of longer-term reversals.  36 
 
section, I first look at the usual firm characteristics for the unconditional portfolios sorted 
along the single dimension of either governance or AA. These firm characteristics include: 
Market cap (in millions), calculated monthly as shares outstanding times the month-end share 
price; Price, which is a common proxy in for transaction costs as it has been documented in 
prior literature that low-priced stocks have higher trading costs;  Turnover is the monthly 
number of shares traded relative to the number of shares outstanding; BM or book-to-market 
is the book value equity per share relative to the month-end share price; PE or price-earnings 
ratio is end-of-fiscal-year share price relative to EPS; Div or dividend yield is dividend per 
share  relative  to  share  price;  Sales  Growth;  ROA  or  return  on  assets  is  income  before 
extraordinary items relative to average total assets; Leverage is total net debt relative to total 
assets;  R&D,  research  and  expenditure  expense  relative  to  sales;  Capex1  is  capital 
expenditure relative to sales; Capex2 is capital expenditure relative to average total assets; 
Deferred Revenue is  deferred current revenue (Compustat item DRC) relative to average 
total assets; and Special Item is special items relative to average total assets.   
4.1.1  Characteristics of abnormal accruals portfolio 
From Panel A of Table 1, the median size for the firms in the High AA portfolio is 
bigger with a market cap at $963 million, as compared to $835 million for firms in the low 
accruals portfolio. Firms in the High AA portfolio have relatively higher share price, slightly 
higher trading intensity based on turnover, lower book-to-market ratio, quite similar PE ratio, 
lower  dividend  yield,  higher  sales  growth,  surprisingly  relatively  higher  operating 
performance as measured by return on asset (ROA), relatively similar debt leverage ratio, 
lower R&D investments, higher capex spending, higher deferred revenue, and larger negative 
special items. There is a slightly higher operating performance in the previous year for High 
AA, while there is deterioration (improvement) in ROA in the following year for High AA 37 
 
(Low AA). There is no difference in the average governance quality between the two sets of 
firms as measured by the G-Index
16.  
Most of my results are similar to prior literature findings, and also consistent with the 
popular “growth explanation” for the accruals anomaly with high accruals firm having higher 
sales growth and higher investments (capital expenditure). Fairfield et al (2003) and Zhang 
(2007)  argue  that  the  negative  future  returns  associated  with  high  accruals  are  due  to 
diminishing returns on investments, since the measurement of accruals are scaled by average 
total assets, and therefore high accruals could be capturing high investments or growth. In 
their iconic study, Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) argue that investors extrapolate 
past strong growth information too far into the future, and as a result, stock prices tend to 
reverse for growth firms. Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004) suggests that firms with high capital 
expenditures tend to be overinvesting, and therefore, earn lower future stock returns. Cooper, 
Gulen, and Schill (2008) document a negative relation between asset growth and returns. 
Fama and French (1995, 1996) suggest that growth firms could be financially distressed and 
hence investors are compensated with lower expected returns. My results appear to suggest 
that  firms  with  high  abnormal  accruals  may  not  be  financially  distressed  since  they  are 
relatively bigger in size and have better operating performance. A key difference with prior 
literature is that I am restricted to stocks with data on a G-Index score, which limits my 
sample size to around 1,500 firms on average per year over 1991-2008. Caylor (2010) find 
that  managers  use  discretion  in  deferred  revenue  to  avoid  negative  earnings  surprises. 
                                                           
16 Interestingly,  this  could  be  a  possible  reason  why  none  of  the  prior  literature  had  examined  the  joint 
importance  of  governance  and  abnormal  accruals  in  returns  predictability;  even  though  the  research 
methodology – essentially sorting the firms along the two dimensions of performance measures - is not too 
complicated. Together with the common knowledge that governance and accounting quality might be positively 
correlated with each another (the Pearson correlation coefficient between the G-Index and abnormal accruals in 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) is significantly positive at 0.014), some of the unique information in the unique 
pairing of the signals are hidden in the statistical averages. Simply controlling for corporate governance as an 
independent variable in multiple regression models might not be appropriate since the regression orthogonalizes 
the  independent  variables  with  respect  to  one  another,  and  any  unique  information  that  comes  from  the 
combination of both information are not captured in the coefficients.  38 
 
Interestingly, the high accruals firm in my sample have higher deferred revenue (5.8 percent 
of average total assets), which could suggest that they are also opportunistically manipulating 
deferred revenue.  
Dechow and Ge (2006) find that low accrual firms are more likely to have negative 
non-cash special items, such as an asset write-off. These low accrual firms with negative 
special  items  have  higher  ROA  and  higher  positive  future  abnormal  returns,  and  they 
interpret the results to mean that accounting accruals decisions by managers to take a one-
time charge is a signal that it is taking actions to turn the firm around. Also, they infer that 
investors fail to understand that these negative special items are transitory and exhibit low 
earnings persistence, and thus, the accruals anomaly is more pronounced for these firms. I 
find that the Low AA firms in my sample have negative special items (1.1 percent of average 
total assets) and ROA improves in the following year, consistent with Dechow and Ge (2006).  
4.1.2  Characteristics of governance quality portfolio 
From Panel B of Table 1, the median size for the firms in the Democracy portfolio is 
surprisingly  smaller  with  a  market  cap  at  $918  million,  as  compared  to  $1.6  billion  in 
Dictatorship,  as  it  is  often  thought  that  bigger  firms  have  more  resources  to  spend  on 
installing corporate governance practices. Democracy firms have relatively lower share price, 
higher turnover, quite similar book-to-market ratio, higher PE ratio, lower dividend yield, 
higher sales growth, less leverage, higher R&D, higher capex, higher deferred revenue, and 
relatively similar slight negative special items. Surprisingly, there is no significant difference 
in the comparison of current and next-period operating performance (ROA) for both sets of 
firms.   
4.2  Baseline results 
Table  2  shows  the  monthly  intercepts  or  alphas  in  the  Fama-French-Carhart 
regressions  for  the  portfolios  double-sorted  independently  by  governance  quality  and 39 
 
abnormal  accruals  (AA)  measured  using  the  Dechow  and  Dichev  (2002)  model
17.  The 
intercepts, which indicate abnormal future returns, have been multiplied by 100 so that they 
can be interpreted as percentages.  
In Panel A of Table  2 which describes the data for the overall sample period from 
September  1,  1991  to  December  31,  2008,  the  monthly  alpha  for  the  unconditional 
Democracy portfolio is positive at 0.289 percent, albeit statistically insignificant. For the sub-
period September 1, 1991 to December 31, 1999 in Panel B of Table 2, which is the original 
sample period in GIM (2003), the monthly alpha is positive at 0.212 percent, which is quite 
close in economic significance to the 0.29 percent for the original and smaller Democracy 
portfolio  in  GIM  (2003),  although  it  is  statistically  insignificant.  Recall  that  as  per  the 
description in Section 3, I have extended the sample size of the Democracy portfolio which 
now comprises 27.9 percent of the sample on average, as compared to the original 9 percent 
in GIM (2003). The unconditional Low AA portfolio has significant positive abnormal future 
return at 6.4 percent per year (t-statistics of 2.60) over 1991-2008 and 6.6 percent (t-statistics 
of 2.16) in the sub-period 1991-1999, although the positive return is no longer significant in 
the sub-period 2000-2008, which is consistent with Sloan (1996) and also with the recent 
findings  in  Green  et  al  (2008)  that  the  returns  to  the  abnormal  accruals  portfolio  are 
dissipating due to hedge funds overcrowding the trades in exploiting this signal. 
                                                           
17 Sorting the firms  first by  governance and then by abnormal accruals (AA), or  first  by  AA and then  by 
governance,  give  basically  the  same  qualitative  results.  I  also  conduct  sorts  based  on  the  most  extreme 
governance and AA i.e. firms with G-Index score of 5 and below (14 and above) are classified as Democracy 
(Dictatorship), while firms with AA Score of 1 (10) are classified as Low AA (High AA), and it also does not 
significantly affect qualitatively the results. I stick with the extended sample classification of Democracy firms 
as having a G-Index score of 7 and Low AA (High AA) firms as having an AA Score of 3 and below (8 and 
above) since the portfolio returns of these groups are economically similar in magnitude in the original GIM 
(2003)  and  Sloan  (1996),  and  it  ensures  that  there  is  a  reasonable  number  of  firms  in  each  of  the  two-
dimensional  sorted  portfolios  to  increases  the  degrees  of  freedom  so  as  to  yield  a  more  reliable  statistical 
interpretation of the results. I also argue that there is a heightened increase in attention on corporate governance 
and the abnormal accruals signal, especially after the post-GIM and post-Sloan-TAR period, and investors will 
inevitably cast their resources in analyzing near-Democracy-Dictatorship and slightly-less-extreme AA firms. 
Importantly, as one of my key tests is to examine whether isolating Democracy-Low AA firms will enhance 
significantly the governance effects on returns (H1b), such a sorting and re-classification is biased against my 
findings. 40 
 
The portfolio of Democracy firms with Low AA, dubbed Super-Performers, generates 
a positive monthly alpha of 0.875 percent (t-statistics of 2.73), or abnormal return of 10.5 
percent per year from 1991 to 2008. Thus, the null in H1b can be rejected. The 10.5 percent 
abnormal return for this Super-Performers or Democracy-Low AA portfolio is far larger than 
the return for the unconditional Democracy portfolio (3.5 percent). It can be inferred that the 
incremental value in the Low AA signal is 7.0 percent per year. Notice also how the 10.5 
percent abnormal return for this Democracy-Low AA portfolio is higher than the return for the 
unconditional  Low  AA  portfolio  (6.6  percent);  thus,  the  incremental  value  in  the  good 
governance signal is 3.9 percent. These results lend further weight to my conjecture that 
corporate  governance  and  abnormal  acccruals  are  inexorably  linked  through  a 
complementarity relationship; the null in H1c can be rejected. The abnormal return of these 
Super-Performers  are  also  economically  larger  (700  basis  points  per  year)  than  the  long 
position documented in GIM (2003), and is also 200 basis points more than the entire hedge 
returns in GIM (2003). Interestingly, a closer investigation indicate that some of these Super-
Performers include well-known, institutional big-cap stocks, such as Coca-Cola Co, AT&T, 
Hewlett-Packard, Wyeth, Lowe‟s, Home Depot, and EMC, formed in the portfolio at various 
months in the sample period.  
In addition, I find evidence that removing these Super-Performers will reduce the 
remaining Democracy portfolio returns to no different from zero statistically over the period 
of 1991-2008, and over the sub-period of 1991-1999 that was examined in GIM (2003) (H1a). 
In other words, good governance per se no longer pays off, contrary to the findings in GIM 
(2003). Therefore, the null in H1a can be rejected. 
Mixed governance firms, with a G-Index between 8 and 11, comprise 52.1 percent of 
the sample  on average,  and they  are  termed  Drifter. GIM  (2003) and all the subsequent 
literature on governance made no mention about these Drifter firms even though they are the 41 
 
bulk of the sample size. The unconditional monthly alpha for Drifter portfolio is negative on 
average in 1991-2008 and in the two sub-periods (1991-1999 and 2000-2008). Interestingly, I 
find that the portfolio of Drifter with Low AA has significantly positive monthly alpha of 
0.520 percent (t-statistics of 2.22), or abnormal return of 6.2 percent per year over 1991-2008; 
the  returns  are  even  greater  during  the  sub-period  1991-1999  at  9.2  percent  per  year  (t-
statistics  of  2.82).  Thus,  it  is  not  only  good  governance  firms  that  enjoy  positive  future 
abnormal return; Drifter with Low AA can revel in this capital appreciation outperformance as 
well. The factor loading for SMB is significantly positive, indicating that the stocks in this 
particular Drifter-High EQ portfolio tend to be smaller stocks, although this no longer holds 
true in the sub-period 1991-99. During the sub-period of 2000-2008, the monthly alpha for 
the Drifter-High EQ portfolio dropped to an insignificant 0.325 percent. Surprisingly, even 
Dictatorship with Low AA can have positive abnormal return at 2.4 percent per year over 
1991-2008,  albeit  statistically  insignificant,  as  compared  to  0.2  percent  per  year  for  the 
unconditional Dictatorship portfolio. The null in H1d can thus be rejected. 
For the unconditional High AA portfolio, the abnormal future returns is negative 2.2 
percent  per  year  over  1991-2008,  as  expected  under  Sloan  (1996),  albeit  statistically 
insignificant.  Democracy  with  High  AA  have  positive,  albeit  insignificant,  annualized 
abnormal  return  of 3.2  percent,  which lends some support for the null rejection in H2a. 
Unsurprisingly,  High  AA  firms  accompanied  by  Dictatorship  and  Drifter  governance 
structures have negative abnormal annualized returns of 0.9 and 7.5 percent (t-statistics of -
2.90) respectively, which are as predicted by Sloan (1996); thus, the null in H2b can be 
rejected, particularly for the Drifter-High AA portfolio. Interestingly, the excess performance 
for the Drifter-High AA portfolio is larger (by 200 basis points per year) than the returns from 
the short position (5.5 percent per year) documented in Sloan (1996). The factor loading SMB 42 
 
for  the  Drifter-High  AA  firms  is  significantly  positive,  indicating  that  the  stocks  in  this 
portfolio tend to be smaller stocks. 
The small negative insignificant returns for the short position of the Dictatorship-
High AA portfolio may seem, at first blush, surprising since it is the worst of both worlds. 
However,  this  is  consistent  with  the  findings  in  Core  et  al  (2006)  who  find  that  weak 
governance firms have poorer operating performance, but investors and analysts continue to 
forecast this difference and hence are not systematically surprised to the extent that leads to 
stock  price  declines.  The  results  are  also  consistent  with  Bowen,  Rajgopal  and 
Venkatachalam (2008) who find that managers do not systematically exploit poor governance 
structures  to  engage  in  accounting  discretionary  at  the  shareholders‟  expense  since 
subsequent  future  operating  performance  is  positive.  A  caveat  is  that  stock  returns  as  a 
yardstick  of  performance  measurement  is  a  “noisy”  measure,  since  bad  governance  can 
impose  substantial  ongoing  costs  on  shareholders  with  no  return  effect  so  long  as 
shareholders are not surprised by the costs. 
In the additional test for the Negative ACCREV portfolio of stocks with revelation of 
high  or  extreme  income-increasing  accruals  in  period  t  which  experiences  the  greatest 
magnitude  in  accruals  reversal  in  period  t+1,  the  results  in  Table  3  indicate  positive 
annualized abnormal future returns of 10.8 percent (t-statistics of 1.98) per year for those are 
also Democracy firms, contrary to the expectation of negative future returns in Sloan (1996)
 
18. Delving deeper into this Negative ACCREV-Democracy portfolio, I find that 43 percent of 
the sample are Democracy-High AA in the previous period. This means that not all the firms 
with  extreme  high  abnormal  accruals  in  period  t  reverse  sharply  in  period  t+1.  For  this 
specific group (N = 2785), the future positive abnormal returns is even larger at 20.3 percent 
                                                           
18 In a further robustness check, defining  ACCREVt+1 as the change in abnormal accruals (measured as the 
residual in Dechow and Dichev (2002) model) from period t to period t+1 does not change my results; the 
abnormal returns remain at 10.7 percent per year but more significant (t-statistics 2.58), thus, I report the more 
conservative results.  43 
 
per year over 1991-2008 (t-statistics of 3.18)
19! Again, this is not the negative return that was 
expected  under  Sloan‟s  hypothesis.  On  one  hand,  negative  accruals  reversal  may  imply 
aggressive  accounting,  such  as  managers  opportunistically  boosting  inventory  accruals  in 
period t and subsequently being forced to write down inventory in period t+1 when demand 
falls  short.  On  the  other  hand,  as  the  cash  consequences  that  the  accruals  anticipate  are 
realized when the accruals reverse, the trend of reported earnings and the subsequent accruals 
reversals  at  these  negative  accruals  reversal  firms  who  have  at  the  same  time  good 
governance structures are interpreted as credible private signals of firm performance by the 
managers,  resulting  in  larger  positive  future  stock  return.  This  can  be  explain  by  how 
earnings trend consistency is valued at a premium by the market (Barth, Elliott, and Finn, 
1999),  as  is  consistency  in  benchmark  performance  (Bartov  et  al,  2002;  Kasznik  and 
McNichols, 2002). Thus, the null in H3 can be rejected.  
It may be argued that if there is incremental value in the good governance signal, then 
there  should  be  positive  abnormal  future  return  for  the  Positive  ACCREV-Democracy 
portfolio as well, or those firms who have low or extreme income-decreasing accruals in 
period t which experiences large accruals reversal to high accruals in period t+1. I find some 
evidence that this holds true, particularly in the sub-period 1991-1999 where the Positive 
ACCREV-Democracy portfolio generates positive abnormal future return of 9.7 percent per 
year, although the magnitude is greatly reduced to 2.4 percent for the overall sample period 
1991-2008 and is  also  no longer significant.  The factor loadings  for  SMB and  HML  are 
significantly positive and negative respectively, indicating that the stocks in this particular 
portfolio tend to be smaller and “growth” stocks. 
                                                           
19 The remaining 57 percent of the sample have a positive monthly alpha of 0.569 percent, or 6.8 percent per 
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Overall, the empirical results from testing the three hypotheses highlight the joint 
importance  of  governance  and  abnormal  accruals  in  contributing  to  the  total  information 
environment to separate winners from losers.  
Repeating the analysis using the modified Jones model by Dechow et al (1996) to 
estimate the abnormal accruals, all the results as shown in Table 4 and 5 are qualitatively 
similar, although the statistical significance is lost for most of the findings for the overall 
sample period from 1991-2008. A closer investigation highlights that the results hold true in 
the original sub-period 1991-1999 in GIM (2003), but the significance has mainly dissipated 
in the post-GIM sub-period 2000-2008. This is consistent with the findings in Bebchuk et al 
(2010) and Green et al (2008) that the governance effect on performance and the return to the 
abnormal accruals strategy had largely disappeared in the 2000s due to “learning” by the 
market participants or hedge funds deploying excess capital to exploit the signals.  Green et al 
(2009) further argued that the abnormal accruals trading strategy documented by Sloan (1996) 
was known to a few in academe but to no practitioners in the pre-Sloan sub-period 4/89-
12/95. This pre-Sloan period also coincided with my findings that the AA signal provides 
incremental value during the sub-period 1991-1999. However, the accruals anomaly took 
some time to be understood for investors to take definite action (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; 
Lee, 2001; Mitchell, Pedersen, and Pulvino, 2007). In the post-Sloan-TAR period, Green et al 
(2008) pointed out that not only was the accruals anomaly widely known both inside and 
outside of academe, but during the period, key senior accounting academics such as Charles 
Lee and Richard Sloan significantly increased their ties to Barclays Global Investors.  
There is also heightened attention by the SEC, the media, and the public in earnings 
quality issue in the 2000s, particularly after the various accounting scandals epitomized by 
the Enron case, and increased regulatory scrutiny such as the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act, or Sarbox (2002), and Regulation Fair Disclosure, or RegFD (1999-2000), and higher 45 
 
incidence of litigation risks associated with abnormal accruals (DuCharme et al, 2004) during 
this period. These factors could probably account for “lower” opportunistic manipulation of 
accruals in which the “discretionary” portion could be estimated using the now widely-known 
modified Jones model (Cohen, Dey, and Lys, 2008; Bartov and Cohen, 2009), resulting in a 
weaker trading signal, and hence the decaying return and lack of statistical significance for 
my sub-period 2000-2008 from the modified Jones model.   
4.3  Firm  characteristics  and  firm  operating  performance  in  the  two-dimensional 
portfolios  
  In this section, I explore the return on the two-dimensional portfolios in greater depth 
by examining their firm characteristics. In Table 6, I make comparisons between five pairs of 
portfolios: (1) Democracy-Low AA (Super-Performers) Vs. Democracy-High AA portfolios, 
so as to attempt to find out the source of the incremental value in the AA signal in the firm 
characteristics;  (2)  Democracy-Low  AA  (Super-Performers)  Vs.  Dictatorship-Low  AA  to 
assess the incremental value in the governance signal; (3) Drifter-Low AA Vs. Drifter-High 
AA, so as to assess what are so different in the firm-characteristics between these two sets of 
firms beyond the Fama-French-Carhart factors, given that the results that the hedge abnormal 
return can be economically substantial at 13.7 percent per year; (4) Democracy-High AA Vs. 
Dictatorship-High AA, since firms with high abnormal accruals – conventionally interpreted 
as poor earnings quality – are expected to be associated with negative future return, but 
Democracy-High AA firms can instead have positive return – could there be any systematic 
similarities  or  differences  in  firm-characteristics  that  explain  this;  and  finally  (5) 
Dictatorship-Low AA Vs. Dictatorship-High AA, since it is surely an oddity for firms with 
poor governance structures to be associated with positive return if they are also accompanied 
by  Low  AA,  and  investigating  the  firm-characteristics  could  perhaps  prove  fruitful  in  re-
looking into possible instances of “good” managerial entrenchment. 46 
 
First, in the comparison between firms in Democracy-Low AA (Super-Performers) 
and Democracy-High AA in Table 6, Super-Performers are relatively smaller in size with 
median (mean) market cap at $630 million ($3.7 billion) versus $903 million ($4.7 billion) 
for Democracy-High AA firms. Also, Super-Performers have relatively lower share price, 
lower turnover, higher book-to-market ratio, relatively similar PE ratio, higher dividend yield, 
lower  sales  growth,  lower  ROA,  slightly  more  leverage,  lower  R&D  and  capex,  higher 
deferred  revenue,  and  larger  negative  special  items.  There  is  no  difference  in  operating 
performance in the previous year, while there is an improvement (deterioration) in ROA in 
the  following  year  for  Super-Performers  (Democracy-Low  AA).  Second,  as  compared  to 
Dictatorship-Low AA, Super-Performers are similar in size, have lower share price, higher 
turnover, slightly higher book-to-market ratio, lower PE, lower dividend yield, quite similar 
sales  growth,  lower  ROA,  lower  leverage,  higher  R&D  and  capex,  and  higher  deferred 
revenue. There is a slightly lower operating performance in the previous year for Democracy-
Low AA, while there is an improvement in ROA in the following year for both. Interestingly, 
higher capex investments in the hands of the managers at these Super-Performers do not lead 
to poor stock return as was suggested by Titman et al (2004).  
The results appear to suggest that Super-Performers could be “turnaround-stocks” as 
they have larger negative special items (such as a one-time non-cash restructuring write-off) 
and better subsequent operating performance. Thus, their outsized performance could be due 
to investors failing to understand the transitory nature of negative non-cash special items, 
pronouncing  the  return  from  the  low  accruals  anomaly,  according  to  the  arguments  in 
Dechow and Ge (2006). In the discussion of the paper by Dechow and Ge, Fairfield (2006) 
noted  that  “the  evidence  raise  questions  about  the  source  of  the  improved  accounting 
performance ... return on assets for the low accrual/negative special items firms may increase 
for various reason - the lower asset base from the write-off, the absence of negative special 47 
 
items in the following year, or higher „core earnings‟ in the following year. Because Dechow 
and Ge do not control for the effect of the denominator and do not separate future earnings 
into its core and special components, the evidence does not demonstrate conclusively that the 
firms recover in any meaningful sense … poorly performing firms and negative accrual firms 
are not identical sets, but the authors did not differentiate between the two.”  
As  mentioned  earlier,  Super-Performers  include  well-known,  institutional  big-cap 
stocks, such as Coca-Cola Co, formed in the portfolio at various months in 1991-2008. Using 
Coca-Cola as an example
20, I find that the excess return s are mainly from the 1990-1991, 
1994-1997 and 2006 period. Roberto Goizueta took over the re ins of the CEO in 1985 and 
Coca-Cola embarked upon one of the most famous marketing blunders in corporate America 
history by launching the sweeter “New Coke” to compete with Pepsi for the “younger” taste 
buds. “New Coke” was booed with negative publicity and prompted the reversal back to 
“Classic  Coke”.  Coca-Cola  sold  the  non-core  entertainment  business  Columbia  Pictures, 
purchased by Goizueta in 1982, to Sony for $3 billion in 1989. After the restructurings, the 
company emerge stronger from its earlier blunders and re-established itself as the pacesetter 
in the non-alcoholic beverage industry during the 1990s
21.  
In 1990, the company opened the “World of Coca Cola” museum in Atlanta to retell 
its heritage; excess returns were generated in 1990-1991. 1993 saw the introduction of the 
popular  “Always  Coca-Cola”  advertising  campaign,  and  the  world  met  with  the  lovable 
Coca-Cola Polar Bear for the first time.  Coca-Cola also became a major sponsor of the 
Olympics and enjoyed a high profile during the 1996 Olympic Games. By 1997, 1 billion 
                                                           
20 See http://heritage.coca-cola.com/ for a heritage timeline of Coca-Cola.  
21 Interestingly, billionaire investor Warren Buffett purchased 7 percent of Coca-Cola for $1 billion for his listed 
investment holding company Berkshire Hathaway in 1988, and added 1.2 percent along the way at $0.3 billion, 
seemingly demonstrating the sophistication to exploit the joint importance of governance and abnormal accruals 
to generate outsized returns. Of course, he remains a rare exception  - and also an inspiration that the results in 
this paper could be implementable. Buffett‟s $1.3 billion investment cost in Coca-Cola has since grown nearly 
10-folds to around $11 billion.  48 
 
Coca-Cola products were sold every day – and 1997 was also the year of death of its iconic 
CEO  Goizueta;  excess  returns  were  generated  in  1994-1997.  One  of  Goizueta‟s  notable 
accomplishments was to help Coca-Cola realize the goal to develop a diet version of Coke in 
1982; 2005 saw the dé jà -vu launch of Coke Zero, the popular zero calorie cola - excess 
returns were generated in 2006.  
And all these corporate actions took place in a Democracy governance structure at 
Coca-Cola, suggesting that  corporate  governance could  be the important  joint factor that 
Fairfield (2006) questioned about to determine whether the low accrual firms with negative 
special items “recover in any meaningful sense”.  As pointed out in the empirical results in 
Section 4.2, the 10.5 percent abnormal return per year over 1991-2008 for Super-Performers 
(low accruals firms with good governance) is higher than the return for the unconditional low 
accruals portfolio (6.6 percent), indicating that the incremental value in the good governance 
signal is 3.9 percent, and that the complementarity in governance and accruals information is 
important  in  determining  returns  predictability  and  the  persistence  in  longer-term  firm 
performance.   
Third, Drifter-Low AA are slightly bigger in size than Drifter-High AA, have quite 
similar share price, slightly higher turnover, slightly higher book-to-market, quite similar PE 
ratio, slightly higher dividend yield, lower sales growth, lower ROA, quite similar leverage, 
quite similar R&D, lower capex, higher deferred revenue, and larger negative special items. 
There is a slightly lower operating performance in the previous year for Drifter-Low AA, 
while there is an improvement (deterioration) in ROA in the following year for Drifter-Low 
AA (Drifter-High AA). The “restructuring effect” is probably at work again for the positive 
abnormal return at Drifter-Low AA who have large negative special items. Interestingly, it 
also further reinforces the importance of governance quality in determining the persistence in 
longer-term  firm  performance  since  Super-Performers  (low  accruals  firms  with  good 49 
 
governance) generate 4.3 percent per  year more in abnormal return over 1991-2008 than 
Drifter with similarly negative accruals and negative special items. 
Fourth, Democracy-High AA are smaller in size than Dictatorship-High AA, have 
lower share price, higher turnover, quite similar book-to-market ratio, higher PE ratio, lower 
dividend yield, higher sales growth, higher ROA, lower leverage, higher R&D and capex, 
higher deferred revenue, and quite similar negative special items. There is a mixed operating 
performance in the previous  year for  Democracy-Low AA, while there is deterioration in 
ROA in the following year for both. The results appear to suggest that booking higher sales 
growth and larger corporate investments (capex and R&D) are regarded as a genuine attempt 
by the managers to increase shareholders‟ wealth even if it increases abnormal accruals and 
impacts  short-term  operating  performance  (lower  ROA  in  the  following  year)  at  the 
Democracy-High  AA  firms,  and  hence  their  future  return  is  not  negative  (although  not 
significantly positive) as predicted under Sloan.  
Fifth, Dictatorship-Low AA are smaller in size than Dictatorship-High AA, have lower 
share  price,  slightly  lower  turnover,  higher  book-to-market  ratio,  higher  PE  ratio,  higher 
dividend  yield,  lower  sales  growth,  lower  ROA,  higher  leverage,  slightly  higher  R&D, 
slightly lower capex, higher deferred revenue, and larger negative special items. There is a 
slightly lower operating performance in the previous year for Dictatorship-Low AA, while 
there is an improvement (deterioration) in ROA in the following year for Dictatorship-Low 
AA  (Dictatorship-High  AA).  This  appears  to  suggest  that  the  supposed  “entrenched” 
managers at Dictatorship-Low AA are probably achievers who want a “quiet life” and they 
produce higher future operating performance and pay a higher dividend yield to shareholders. 
This is different from the results in Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) that show profitability 
declined in the firms run by “quiet-life” entrenched managers. The reason is likely because 
the incremental value in the AA signal helps in separating the quiet-performing managers 50 
 
from the “quietly” destructive entrenched managers who produce discordantly poor future 
operating performance. 
5.   Robustness Test 
Kraft, Leone, and Wasley (2006) document a “look-ahead bias” in many accruals 
studies. Because many studies using the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model were interested in 
examining the evolution of accruals as well as the stock returns to an accruals-based trading 
strategy, the sample selection required that the next  year‟s  cash flow from operations be 
present. But whether or not the numbers are present in the next year is not known at the time 
of portfolio formation, so the documented return is not the result of an implementable trading 
strategy. Kraft et al (2006) show in a sample of NYSE/AMEX firms that the return to the low 
accrual portfolio is 4.2 percent with the bias present but only 1.8 percent without it. 
I investigate further this “look-ahead bias” by removing the term CFOt+1 in equation 
(2) and running the modified regression model which comprise of only historical accounting 
data known at the portfolio formation date. In Table 7 and 8, I find that all of my results are 
strikingly  very  similar,  although  the  magnitude  of  the  abnormal  return  to  the  Super-
Performers is reduced to 6.5 percent per year (t-statistics 1.92) for 1991-2008 as compared to 
10.5  percent  in  the  original  model.  The  abnormal  return  to  the  unconditional  Low  AA 
portfolio is reduced slightly to 5.7 percent per year (t-statistics 2.24) from 6.4 percent. The 
Drifter-Low AA portfolio has a slight increase in abnormal return to 6.6 per cent per year (t-
statistics  1.84)  from  6.2  percent,  although  the  significance  is  lowered.  In  addition,  the 
abnormal  return  to  the  Drifter-High  AA  portfolio  is  negative  at  3.0  percent  per  year,  as 
compared  to  minus  7.5  percent  in  the  original  model,  and  is  no  longer  significant.  The 
positive abnormal return to the Negative ACCREV-Democracy portfolio is reduced slightly to 
9.4 percent per year (t-statistics 2.09) for 1991-2008 as compared to 10.8 percent. In short, 
the trading strategy still remains viable economically and statistically.  51 
 
Interestingly, the results also reinforced the importance of the prospective cash flow 
from  operations  information,  since  its  inclusion  into  the  regression  model  to  estimate 
abnormal accruals greatly enhance the magnitude of the future abnormal return. Dechow, 
Richardson and Sloan (2008) conjectured it is the use of cash, rather than the raising or the 
distribution of financing, that leads to predictable returns. Information of next-period‟s cash 
flow from operations can reveal much about the use of cash, and market participants can 
assess whether managers have been credible in what they have communicated in the previous 
period(s) on how they intend to utilize cash in investment projects, and my results in this 
robustness test support the argument in Dechow et al (2008). 
5.   Summary and Conclusion 
The signals of corporate governance and abnormal accruals are akin to the bow and 
arrow in a complementarity relationship, resolving the uncertainty associated with what each 
signal can reveal on a stand-alone basis about firm performance and its future prospects, as 
well as aiding in the understanding of whether managers exercise accounting discretion in an 
opportunistic or efficient manner. The bow (governance signal) without the arrow (abnormal 
accruals signal) is not effective; the governance effect on returns is attenuated to no different 
from zero when the firms with both good governance and low abnormal accruals (AA) are 
removed. Similarly, the arrow without the bow cannot shoot far and sharply to yield outsized 
abnormal future return; Super-Performers, the firms with both good governance and Low AA, 
can generate abnormal return of 10.5 percent per year over 1991-2008, as compared to the 3.5 
and  6.4  percent  for  the  unconditional  good  governance  and  Low  AA  firms  respectively, 
illuminating the incremental value in what each signal can bring to each other. Together, the 
unique pairing of the “arrow” and the “bow” contributes to the total information environment 
to separate winners from losers.    52 
 
The orthodox view since Sloan (1996) that high accruals is associated with negative 
future  stock  return  has  resulted  in  high  accruals  to  be  widely  interpreted  as  evidence  of 
earnings management or poor earnings quality.  The Icarus manager, exalted by his flight 
when flying the pair of flexible accruals wax wings based upon the revenue recognition and 
matching principles, was flying too high to the nearness of the blazing sun, which softened 
the wax that held the feathers together. Daedalus cried out to his son that the wings were built 
for a higher purpose than his self-satisfaction; Icarus ignored the teachings of his father and 
flew higher, thinking his wings made him the equal of the Gods. The pair of wings came off, 
and  Icarus  plunged  into  the  sea;  akin  to  extreme  accruals  reversal  and  the  “consequent” 
negative future stock return. Thus, the Icarus-managers‟ accounting accruals discretion need 
to be curbed, since investors cannot unravel the valuation effect of reported earnings in a 
timely manner under current reporting standards.  
Such a  dominant  view has  not  been questioned before (Christie and  Zimmerman, 
1996; Louis and Robinson, 2005; Bowen et al, 2008), although uncommon. Most forgot that 
it was Icarus, Daedalus‟ son, who sank, not Daedalus himself. Daedalus escaped the labyrinth 
of King Midas and was the only mortal to fly without divine assistance. Healy and Whalen 
(1999) believe in the importance in identifying and explaining “which types of accruals are 
used for earnings management and which are not”. My results raise doubts that investors 
respond  in  the  same  manner  to  abnormal  accruals,  since  Democracy  firms  with  high  or 
extreme income-increasing AA have positive future return. This suggests two things: one, the 
level of abnormal accruals is a coarse measure of earnings manipulation for these set of firms, 
although it appears to remain a reasonable proxy of earnings management or earnings quality 
for  firms  with  mixed  or  poor  governance  structures;  and  two,  shareholders  benefit  from 
“earnings  management”  because  the  high  accruals  signals  future  performance  (e.g. 
Subramanyam,  1996;  Chaney  et  al,  1996).  The  evidence  helps  in  the  understanding  of 53 
 
investor behavior and whether the policy recommendations in Richardson, Sloan, Soliman, 
and Tuna (2005, 2006) and FASB to curtail the use of “less reliable” components of accruals 
are appropriate, especially for Democracy firms. If the joint interactive signal of governance 
and abnormal accruals can be a more informative measure of firm performance, reforms to 
limit managerial flexibility may be counterproductive and an “Icarus paradox”.  
This study is also the first, to the best of my knowledge, to investigate the properties 
of the mixed governance (Drifter) firms, the group of firms unexamined in prior literature 
even though it forms the bulk of the sample size. I document that Drifter can have abnormal 
future returns as well – if the AA signal is combined interactively with the Drifter signal: the 
excess return at Drifter-Low AA is 6.2 per year over 1991-2008 while that at Drifter-High AA 
is negative 7.5 percent per year. In addition, the results restore economic viability to the long 
position  of  both  the  governance  and  abnormal  accruals  trading  strategy,  which  can  be 
important given short-selling constraints in the short position. My paper also contribute to the 
resolution of the highly debated issue in the governance literature by showing how both the 
supporters and critics of the governance effects on returns in GIM (2003) are not incorrect 
when the governance signal is interactively combined with the abnormal accruals information 
to yield unique information about the future prospects of the firm.  
The explicit use of accounting information  in  contracts  between management  and 
financiers represents probably the most visible use of accounting information in governance 
mechanisms (Sloan, 2001). The results in my paper suggest that the design of managerial 
compensation requires obtaining performance measures that do not rely solely on earnings. 
Financiers  require  the  firm  to  have  a  governance  structure  that  will  elicit  the  managers‟ 
private information credibly. It is rare to observe in practice the use of both earnings and 
governance  measures  in  contracting.  Thus,  my  results  suggest  that  the  inclusion  of  both 
measures could result in more efficient contracting.   54 
 
Finally, this paper highlights the salient fact that it is difficult to apply any one single 
measure, such as governance or abnormal accruals, on a stand-alone basis to assess firm 
value and performance, as not only are they one of a multitude of pieces of information of 
possible  interest  about  firms‟  quality,  but  they  also  interact  with  one  another  to  resolve 
informational uncertainty about what each signal can reveal on its own. An investor considers 
a wide array of contextual information to continually rebalance his or her portfolio (Amir and 
Lev, 1996; Shevlin, 1996; Beneish, Lee, and Tarpley, 2001; Sloan, 2001; Sorensen, Hua, and 
Qian, 2005). Interestingly, my paper underscores the value of skillful fundamental analysis in 
moving  away  from  generic  strategies  by  combining  different  contextual  information  - 
governance information in this study - and looking through this lens to reach fresh insights in 
equity  valuation.  This  is  especially  pertinent  in  a  trading  environment  where  large 
quantitative-oriented hedge funds pursue similar strategy resulting in correlated performance 
and destructive destabilizing price impact in deleveraging situations (Khandani and Lo, 2008; 
Boyson,  Stahel  and  Stulz,  2008;  Stein,  2009).  Corporate  governance  is  not  just  about 
complying with rules or reporting requirements. Rather it is about internalizing the values, 
spirit, and purpose behind the rules and is also integral in a company‟s strategy in creating (or 
destroying)  shareholders‟  value.  Thus,  a  sober  consideration  of  the  joint  importance  of 
governance and abnormal accruals information to separate winners and losers is also in the 
spirit of Sloan‟s  sagacious  advice in  the  CFA  Digest 1/2010:  “I believe that using  good 
fundamental analysis to detect accounting distortions by understanding the accounting and 
the company‟s strategy and how they fit together will always be an incredibly important 
source of value-added for the investment management community”. 55 
 
Table 1: Comparison of firm characteristics for 1991 to 2008 
Table 1 report the firm characteristics of the three categories of portfolio sorted by (a) abnormal accruals (Panel A) and (b) 
governance quality (Panel B). G-Index is the governance score from IRRC/Risk Metrics. Abnormal Accrual is calculated 
from the residual in Dechow and Dichev (2002) model. The magnitude of the abnormal accrual is sorted into 10-decile 
portfolios and firms with the lowest (highest) abnormal accrual have an AA Score of 1 (10). Market cap (in millions) is 
calculated monthly as shares outstanding times the month-end share price. Turnover is the monthly number of shares traded 
relative to the number of shares outstanding. BM or book-to-market is the book value equity per share relative to the month-
end share price. PE or price-earnings ratio is end-of-fiscal-year share price relative to EPS. Div or dividend yield is dividend 
per share relative to share price. ROA or return on assets is income before extraordinary items relative to average total assets. 
Leverage is total net debt relative to total assets. R&D is research and expenditure expense relative to sales. Capex1 is capital 
expenditure relative to sales. Capex2 is capital expenditure relative to average total assets. Deferred Revenue is deferred 
current revenue (Compustat item DRC) relative to average total assets. Special Item is special items relative to average total 
assets. N is the number of firm-months. Means tests are based on time-series of monthly cross-sectional means. 
 
Panel A: Firms sorted by abnormal accruals 
  Low AA 
(N = 24139) 
High AA 




(N = 41936 ) 
  Mean  Median  Mean  Median  p-value  Mean  Median 
G-Index  8.8  9.0  8.8  9.0  0.897  9.1  9.0 
Abnormal Accrual  -0.031  -0.022  0.029  0.022  < .01  0.000  -0.000 
Market cap  4087.811  835.380  4522.744  963.255  < .01  5061.764  1393.431 
Price  26.012  21.750  28.171  23.938  < .01  31.160  27.813 
Turnover  1.567  1.022  1.609  0.990  < .01  1.258  0.786 
BM  0.580  0.451  0.512  0.411  < .01  0.560  0.484 
PE   17.354  16.618  18.179  16.252  0.535  20.603  16.046 
Div  0.016  0.000  0.012  0.002  < .01  0.024  0.013 
Sales Growth  0.070  0.047  0.172  0.109  < .01  0.105  0.074 
ROAt-1  0.023  0.041  0.030  0.054  < .01  0.038  0.043 
ROAt  0.011  0.033  0.061  0.069  < .01  0.045  0.046 
ROAt+1  0.037  0.048  0.049  0.060  < .01  0.048  0.048 
Leverage  0.113  0.118  0.105  0.118  < .01  0.216  0.242 
R&D  0.191  0.068  0.290  0.010  < .01  1.164  0.000 
Capex1  0.073  0.038  0.095  0.045  < .01  0.131  0.051 
Capex2  0.055  0.041  0.066  0.051  < .01  0.064  0.051 
Deferred Revenue  0.010  0.000  0.058  0.000  < .01  0.005  0.000 
Special Item  -0.023  -0.001  -0.011  0.000  < .01  -0.009  0.000 
 
Panel B: Firms sorted by governance quality 
  Democracy 
(N = 26677) 
Dictatorship 




(N = 45134) 
  Mean  Median  Mean  Median  p-value  Mean  Median 
G-Index  5.8  6.0  12.9  13.0  < .01  9.5  9.0 
Abnormal Accrual  -0.002  -0.000  -0.001  -0.001  < .01  -0.001  -0.000 
AA Score  5.3  5.0  5.4  5.0  < .01  5.4  5.0 
Market cap  4592.904  918.294  5024.484  1622.911  < .01  4575.248  1141.564 
Price  26.733  23.188  32.698  29.130  < .01  29.070  25.420 
Turnover  1.521  0.881  1.090  0.766  < .01  1.492  0.955 
BM  0.560  0.448  0.533  0.468  < .01  0.557  0.460 
PE   23.093  16.300  16.843  16.208  < .01  17.537  16.155 
Div  0.016  0.000  0.028  0.018  < .01  0.017  0.058 
Sales Growth  0.131  0.088  0.087  0.063  < .01  0.108  0.073 
ROAt-1  0.035  0.048  0.042  0.045  < .01  0.027  0.044 
ROAt  0.045  0.050  0.045  0.047  0.737  0.034  0.047 
ROAt+1  0.050  0.052  0.051  0.051  0.516  0.040  0.049 
Leverage  0.126  0.115  0.210  0.228  < .01  0.163  0.186 
R&D  0.183  0.000  0.035  0.003  < .01  1.201  0.000 
Capex1  0.096  0.047  0.057  0.040  < .01  0.129  0.047 
Capex2  0.065  0.049  0.053  0.046  < .01  0.063  0.048 
Deferred Revenue  0.008  0.000  0.002  0.000  < .01  0.007  0.000 
Special Item  -0.012  0.000  -0.012  0.000  0.472  -0.014  0.000 56 
 
Table 2: Monthly alphas of portfolios sorted two-dimensionally by governance and abnormal accruals (Dechow and 
Dichev, 2002) 
Table 2 reports the portfolios‟ value-weighted monthly alphas, estimated using Fama-French (1993) three-factor model and 
includes the Carhart (1997) momentum factor from WRDS.  
Rt = α + β1RMRFt + β2SMBt + β3HMLt + β4UMDt + εt 
The dependent variable is the value-weighted monthly portfolio excess return Rt. The explanatory variables RMRF, SMB, 
HML  and  UMD  are  the  returns  to  zero-investment  portfolios  designed  to  capture  market,  size,  book-to-market,  and 
momentum effects, respectively. The coefficients of these factors are not reported in the table for brevity. Stocks formed in 
the portfolios are sorted two-dimensionally by governance and abnormal accruals (AA, measured by Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) model). Stocks sorted by governance are reset in September 1990, July 1993, July 1995, February 1998, February 
2000, February 2002, January 2004, and January 2006, which are the months when new data on G-Index are available. I 
extended the sample size of the Democracy (good governance) portfolio in GIM (2003) by including firms with qualitatively 
similar  positive  monthly  alphas  and  re-grouping  the  Democracy  portfolio  as  firms  with  a  G-Index  score  of  7  or  less. 
Following this, Democracy firms now comprise 27.9 percent of the sample on average as compared to the original 9 percent. 
Similarly, I re-classified firms with a G-Index of 12 and above as Dictatorship (bad governance), now comprising 20.0 
percent of the sample on average, as compared to the original 5.5 percent. The remaining mixed governance firms, termed 
Drifter, have a G-Index between 8 and 11 and comprise 52.1 percent of the sample on average. For the stocks sorted by EQ, 
ten decile portfolios ranked by the magnitude of the residuals in the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model are formed three 
months after the end of each fiscal year to ensure that the financial statements are publicly available. The portfolio of firms 
with the lowest (highest) value in residuals is given an AA score of 1 (10). Similar to the approach used in sorting the firms 
into the three categories of governance structures, the group of firms with a score of 3 and below is re-classified as “Low or 
Income-Decreasing Abnormal Accruals (AA)”; those with a score between 4 and 7 are classified as “Mixed AA”; and finally, 
those with a score of 8 and above are classified as “High or Income-Increasing AA”. Panel A describes the overall sample 
period from September 1990 to December 2008; Panel B is the sub-period from September 1, 1991 to December 31, 1999 as 
in GIM (2003); and Panel C is the post-GIM sub-period from January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2008. All standard errors are 
White (1980) robust and the t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Levels of significance are indicated by *, **, *** for 
10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
Panel A: Overall sample period Sep 1, 1991 – Dec 31, 2008 
Portfolios  Low AA   Mixed AA  High AA  Overall 
































Panel B: Sub-period (1) Sep 1, 1991 – Dec 31, 1999 
Portfolios  Low AA   Mixed AA  High AA  Overall 
































Panel C: Sub-period (2) Jan 1, 2000 – Dec 31, 2008 
Portfolios  Low AA   Mixed AA  High AA  Overall 

































Table 3: Accruals reversal (Dechow and Dichev, 2002) and future stock returns  
Table 3 reports the portfolios‟ value-weighted monthly alphas, estimated using Fama-French (1993) three-factor model and 
includes the Carhart (1997) momentum factor from WRDS.  
Rt = α + β1RMRFt + β2SMBt + β3HMLt + β4UMDt + εt 
The dependent variable is the value-weighted monthly portfolio excess return Rt. The explanatory variables RMRF, SMB, 
HML  and  UMD  are  the  returns  to  zero-investment  portfolios  designed  to  capture  market,  size,  book-to-market,  and 
momentum effects, respectively. The coefficients of these factors are not reported in the table for brevity. The portfolios are 
sorted two-dimensionally by governance and accruals reversal ACCREVt+1 (measured as the difference between accruals in 
the current period and accruals in the previous period, with the accruals being estimated as ∆WC in equation (2) in Dechow 
and Dichev (2002) model) that were described in Section 3. The stocks sorted by governance are reset in September 1990, 
July 1993, July 1995, February 1998, February 2000, February 2002, January 2004, and January 2006, which are the months 
when new data on G-Index are available. I extended the sample size of the Democracy (good governance) portfolio in GIM 
(2003) by including firms with qualitatively similar positive monthly alphas and re-grouping the Democracy portfolio as 
firms with a G-Index score of 7 or less. Following this, Democracy firms now comprise 27.9 percent of the sample on 
average as compared to the original 9 percent. Similarly, I re-classified firms with a G-Index of 12 and above as Dictatorship 
(bad governance), now comprising 20.0 percent of the sample on average, as compared to the original 5.5 percent. The 
remaining mixed governance firms, termed Drifter, have a G-Index between 8 and 11 and comprise 52.1 percent of the 
sample on average. The magnitude of ACCREVt+1 is sorted and ranked to form ten decile portfolios three months after the 
end of each fiscal year to ensure that the financial statements are publicly available, and then they are matched with the 
monthly CRSP returns in period t+1. The portfolio of firms with the lowest (highest) value in ACCREVt+1 is given an 
accruals reversal score of 1 (10). The group of firms with a score of 3 and below is re-classified as big net negative accruals 
reversal (Negative Accruals Reversal); those with a score between 4 and 7 are classified as mixed accruals reversal (Mixed 
Accruals Reversal); and finally, those with a score of 8 and above are classified as big net positive accruals reversal (Positive 
Accruals Reversal). Panel A describes the overall sample period from September 1990 to December 2008; Panel B is the 
sub-period from September 1, 1991 to December 31, 1999 as in GIM (2003); and Panel C is the post-GIM sub-period from 
January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2008.  All standard errors are White (1980) robust and the t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. Levels of significance are indicated by *, **, *** for 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
Panel A: Overall sample period Sep 1, 1991 – Dec 31, 2008 







































Panel B: Sub-period (1) Sep 1, 1991 – Dec 31, 1999 







































Panel C: Sub-period (2) Jan 1, 2000 – Dec 31, 2008 








































Table 4: Monthly alphas of portfolios sorted two-dimensionally by governance and abnormal accruals (Dechow et al, 
1996) 
Table 4 reports the portfolios‟ value-weighted monthly alphas, estimated using Fama-French (1993) three-factor model and 
includes the Carhart (1997) momentum factor from WRDS.  
Rt = α + β1RMRFt + β2SMBt + β3HMLt + β4UMDt + εt 
The dependent variable is the value-weighted monthly portfolio excess return Rt. The explanatory variables RMRF, SMB, 
HML  and  UMD  are  the  returns  to  zero-investment  portfolios  designed  to  capture  market,  size,  book-to-market,  and 
momentum effects, respectively. The coefficients of these factors are not reported in the table for brevity. Stocks formed in 
the portfolios are sorted two-dimensionally by governance and abnormal accruals (AA, measured by Dechow et al (1996) 
model). Stocks sorted by governance are reset in September 1990, July 1993, July 1995, February 1998, February 2000, 
February 2002, January 2004, and January 2006, which are the months when new data on G-Index are available. I extended 
the sample size of the Democracy (good governance) portfolio in GIM (2003) by including firms with qualitatively similar 
positive monthly alphas and re-grouping the Democracy portfolio as firms with a G-Index score of 7 or less. Following this, 
Democracy firms now comprise 27.9 percent of the sample on average as compared to the original 9 percent. Similarly, I re-
classified firms with a G-Index of 12 and above as Dictatorship (bad governance), now comprising 20.0 percent of the 
sample on average, as compared to the original 5.5 percent. The remaining mixed governance firms, termed Drifter, have a 
G-Index between 8 and 11 and comprise 52.1 percent of the sample on average. For the stocks sorted by EQ, ten decile 
portfolios ranked by the magnitude of the residuals in the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model are formed three months after 
the end of each fiscal year to ensure that the financial statements are publicly available. The portfolio of firms with the 
lowest (highest) value in residuals is given an AA score of 1 (10). Similar to the approach used in sorting the firms into the 
three categories of governance structures, the group of firms with a score of 3 and below is re-classified as “Low or Income-
Decreasing Abnormal Accruals (AA)”; those with a score between 4 and 7 are classified as “Mixed AA”; and finally, those 
with a score of 8 and above are classified as “High or Income-Increasing AA”. Panel A describes the overall sample period 
from September 1990 to December 2008; Panel B is the sub-period from September 1, 1991 to December 31, 1999 as in 
GIM (2003); and Panel C is the post-GIM sub-period from January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2008. All standard errors are 
White (1980) robust and the t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Levels of significance are indicated by *, **, *** for 
10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
Panel A: Overall sample period Sep 1, 1991 – Dec 31, 2008 
Portfolios  Low AA   Mixed AA  High AA  Overall 
































Panel B: Sub-period (1) Sep 1, 1991 – Dec 31, 1999 
Portfolios  Low AA   Mixed AA  High AA  Overall 
































Panel C: Sub-period (2) Jan 1, 2000 – Dec 31, 2008 
Portfolios  Low AA   Mixed AA  High AA  Overall 

































Table 5: Accruals reversal (Dechow et al, 1996) and future stock returns  
Table 5 reports the portfolios‟ value-weighted monthly alphas, estimated using Fama-French (1993) three-factor model and 
includes the Carhart (1997) momentum factor from WRDS.  
Rt = α + β1RMRFt + β2SMBt + β3HMLt + β4UMDt + εt 
The dependent variable is the value-weighted monthly portfolio excess return Rt. The explanatory variables RMRF, SMB, 
HML  and  UMD  are  the  returns  to  zero-investment  portfolios  designed  to  capture  market,  size,  book-to-market,  and 
momentum effects, respectively. The coefficients of these factors are not reported in the table for brevity. The portfolios are 
sorted two-dimensionally by governance and accruals reversal ACCREVt+1 (measured as the difference between accruals in 
the current period and accruals in the previous period, with the accruals being estimated as TACC in equation (3) in Dechow 
et al (1996) model) that were described in Section 3. The stocks sorted by governance are reset in September 1990, July 
1993, July 1995, February 1998, February 2000, February 2002, January 2004, and January 2006, which are the months 
when new data on G-Index are available. I extended the sample size of the Democracy (good governance) portfolio in GIM 
(2003) by including firms with qualitatively similar positive monthly alphas and re-grouping the Democracy portfolio as 
firms with a G-Index score of 7 or less. Following this, Democracy firms now comprise 27.9 percent of the sample on 
average as compared to the original 9 percent. Similarly, I re-classified firms with a G-Index of 12 and above as Dictatorship 
(bad governance), now comprising 20.0 percent of the sample on average, as compared to the original 5.5 percent. The 
remaining mixed governance firms, termed Drifter, have a G-Index between 8 and 11 and comprise 52.1 percent of the 
sample on average. The magnitude of ACCREVt+1 is sorted and ranked to form ten decile portfolios three months after the 
end of each fiscal year to ensure that the financial statements are publicly available, and then they are matched with the 
monthly CRSP returns in period t+1. The portfolio of firms with the lowest (highest) value in ACCREVt+1 is given an 
accruals reversal score of 1 (10). The group of firms with a score of 3 and below is re-classified as big net negative accruals 
reversal (Negative Accruals Reversal); those with a score between 4 and 7 are classified as mixed accruals reversal (Mixed 
Accruals Reversal); and finally, those with a score of 8 and above are classified as big net positive accruals reversal (Positive 
Accruals Reversal). Panel A describes the overall sample period from September 1990 to December 2008; Panel B is the 
sub-period from September 1, 1991 to December 31, 1999 as in GIM (2003); and Panel C is the post-GIM sub-period from 
January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2008.  All standard errors are White (1980) robust and the t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. Levels of significance are indicated by *, **, *** for 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
Panel A: Overall sample period Sep 1, 1991 – Dec 31, 2008 







































Panel B: Sub-period (1) Sep 1, 1991 – Dec 31, 1999 







































Panel C: Sub-period (2) Jan 1, 2000 – Dec 31, 2008 







































Table 6: Comparison of firm characteristics sorted two-dimensionally by governance and abnormal accruals for 1991 
to 2008  
Table 6 report the firm characteristics of the three categories of portfolio  sorted two-dimensionally by  governance and 
abnormal accruals. Market cap (in millions) is calculated monthly as shares outstanding times the month-end share price. 
Turnover is the monthly number of shares traded relative to the number of shares outstanding. BM or book-to-market is the 
book value equity per share relative to the month-end share price. PE or price-earnings ratio is end-of-fiscal-year share price 
relative to EPS. Div or dividend yield is dividend per share relative to share price. ROA or return on assets is income before 
extraordinary items relative to average total assets. Leverage is total net debt relative to total assets. R&D is research and 
expenditure expense relative to sales. Capex1 is capital expenditure relative to sales. Capex2 is capital expenditure relative to 
average total assets. Deferred Revenue is deferred current revenue (Compustat item DRC) relative to average total assets. 
Special Item is special items relative to average total assets. N is the number of firm-months. Means tests are based on time-
series of monthly cross-sectional means. Abnormal Accrual is calculated from the residual in Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
model. 
 
Panel A: Democracy-Low AA Vs. Democracy-High AA 
  Democracy-Low AA 
(N = 7887) 
Democracy-High AA 
(N = 6913) 
Means t-test 
  Mean  Median  Mean  Median  p-value 
Market cap  3675.930  630.576  4654.919  903.396  < .01 
Price  23.712  19.625  27.472  23.438  < .01 
Turnover  1.605  1.002  1.778  1.110  < .01 
BM  0.615  0.461  0.496  0.380  < .01 
PE   20.802  17.293  21.817  17.279  0.563 
Div  0.015  0.000  0.009  0.000  < .01 
Sales Growth  0.086  0.058  0.205  0.131  < .01 
ROAt-1  0.028  0.046  0.029  0.064  0.734 
ROAt  0.015  0.037  0.071  0.078  < .01 
ROAt+1  0.039  0.052  0.058  0.072  < .01 
Leverage  0.073  0.047  0.061  0.044  < .01 
R&D  0.188  0.000  0.392  0.006  < .01 
Capex1  0.086  0.039  0.116  0.048  < .01 
Capex2  0.060  0.043  0.074  0.056  < .01 
Deferred Revenue  0.010  0.000  0.006  0.000  < .01 
Special Item  -0.021  0.000  -0.010  0.000  < .01 
Abnormal accruals  -0.033  -0.024  0.030  0.023  < .01 
 
Panel B: Democracy-Low AA Vs. Dictatorship-High AA 
  Democracy-Low AA 
(N = 7887) 
Dictatorship-Low AA 
(N = 4085) 
Means t-test 
  Mean  Median  Mean  Median  p-value 
Market cap  3675.930  630.576  3787.157  1039.968  0.712 
Price  23.712  19.625  28.621  25.25  < .01 
Turnover  1.605  1.002  1.117  0.821  < .01 
BM  0.615  0.461  0.579  0.458  0.060 
PE   20.802  17.293  28.336  17.588  < .01 
Div  0.015  0.000  0.024  0.016  < .01 
Sales Growth  0.086  0.058  0.079  0.042  0.242 
ROAt-1  0.028  0.046  0.032  0.039  0.034 
ROAt  0.015  0.037  0.027  0.032  < .01 
ROAt+1  0.039  0.052  0.047  0.048  < .01 
Leverage  0.073  0.047  0.203  0.232  < .01 
R&D  0.188  0.000  0.039  0.006  < .01 
Capex1  0.086  0.039  0.053  0.034  < .01 
Capex2  0.060  0.043  0.049  0.039  < .01 
Deferred Revenue  0.010  0.000  0.004  0.000  < .01 
Special Item  -0.021  0.000  -0.019  -0.003  0.125 
Abnormal accruals  -0.033  -0.024  -0.027  -0.020  < .01 
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(N = 12167) 
Drifter-High AA 
(N = 10913) 
Means t-test 
  Mean  Median  Mean  Median  p-value 
Market cap  4455.748  916.934  4007.792  950.213  < .01 
Price  26.627  21.930  27.391  22.880  0.073 
Turnover  1.694  1.120  1.650  1.033  < .01 
BM  0.558  0.445  0.523  0.422  < .01 
PE   11.477  15.834  16.175  16.169  0.037 
Div  0.013  0.000  0.012  0.000  < .01 
Sales Growth  0.056  0.041  0.171  0.103  < .01 
ROAt-1  0.017  0.040  0.025  0.051  < .01 
ROAt  0.003  0.031  0.054  0.064  < .01 
ROAt+1  0.033  0.047  0.041  0.057  < .01 
Leverage  0.109  0.115  0.106  0.124  0.453 
R&D  0.243  0.013  0.311  0.014  0.288 
Capex1  0.070  0.038  0.096  0.045  < .01 
Capex2  0.054  0.039  0.065  0.050  < .01 
Deferred Revenue  0.011  0.000  0.007  0.000  < .01 
Special Item  -0.027  -0.003  -0.013  0.000  < .01 
Abnormal accruals  -0.031  -0.022  0.029  0.022  < .01 
 
Panel D: Democracy-High AA Vs. Dictatorship-High AA 
  Democracy-High AA 
(N = 6913) 
Dictatorship-High AA 
(N = 3586) 
Means t-test 
  Mean  Median  Mean  Median  p-value 
Market cap  4654.919  903.396  5835.055  1381.182  < .01 
Price  27.472  23.438  31.896  28.125  < .01 
Turnover  1.778  1.110  1.158  0.752  < .01 
BM  0.496  0.380  0.508  0.451  0.387 
PE   21.817  17.279  17.283  15.227  < .01 
Div  0.009  0.000  0.019  0.016  < .01 
Sales Growth  0.205  0.131  0.109  0.085  < .01 
ROAt-1  0.029  0.064  0.048  0.052  < .01 
ROAt  0.071  0.078  0.064  0.063  < .01 
ROAt+1  0.058  0.072  0.055  0.059  0.285 
Leverage  0.061  0.044  0.184  0.204  < .01 
R&D  0.392  0.006  0.030  0.007  < .01 
Capex1  0.116  0.048  0.056  0.041  < .01 
Capex2  0.074  0.056  0.055  0.048  < .01 
Deferred Revenue  0.006  0.000  0.000  0.000  < .01 
Special Item  -0.010  0.000  -0.011  0.000  0.177 
Abnormal accruals  0.030  0.023  0.027  0.022  < .01 
 
Panel E: Dictatorship-Low AA Vs. Dictatorship-High AA 
  Dictatorship-Low AA 
(N = 4085) 
Dictatorship-High AA 
(N = 3586) 
Means t-test 
  Mean  Median  Mean  Median  p-value 
Market cap  3787.157  1039.968  5835.055  1381.182  < .01 
Price  28.621  25.25  31.896  28.125  < .01 
Turnover  1.117  0.821  1.158  0.752  < .01 
BM  0.579  0.458  0.508  0.451  < .01 
PE   28.336  17.588  17.283  15.227  < .01 
Div  0.024  0.016  0.019  0.016  < .01 
Sales Growth  0.079  0.042  0.109  0.085  < .01 
ROAt-1  0.032  0.039  0.048  0.052  < .01 
ROAt  0.027  0.032  0.064  0.063  < .01 
ROAt+1  0.047  0.048  0.055  0.059  < .01 
Leverage  0.203  0.232  0.184  0.204  < .01 
R&D  0.039  0.006  0.030  0.007  < .01 
Capex1  0.053  0.034  0.056  0.041  0.129 
Capex2  0.049  0.039  0.055  0.048  < .01 
Deferred Revenue  0.004  0.000  0.000  0.000  < .01 
Special Item  -0.019  -0.003  -0.011  0.000  < .01 
Abnormal accruals  -0.027  -0.020  0.027  0.022  < .01 62 
 
Table 7: Monthly alphas of portfolios sorted two-dimensionally by governance and abnormal accruals (Dechow and 
Dichev, 2002, without “look-ahead bias”) 
Table 7 reports the portfolios‟ value-weighted monthly alphas, estimated using Fama-French (1993) three-factor model and 
includes the Carhart (1997) momentum factor from WRDS.  
Rt = α + β1RMRFt + β2SMBt + β3HMLt + β4UMDt + εt 
The dependent variable is the value-weighted monthly portfolio excess return Rt. The explanatory variables RMRF, SMB, 
HML  and  UMD  are  the  returns  to  zero-investment  portfolios  designed  to  capture  market,  size,  book-to-market,  and 
momentum effects, respectively. The coefficients of these factors are not reported in the table for brevity. Stocks formed in 
the portfolios are sorted two-dimensionally by governance and abnormal accruals (AA, measured by Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) model). Stocks sorted by governance are reset in September 1990, July 1993, July 1995, February 1998, February 
2000, February 2002, January 2004, and January 2006, which are the months when new data on G-Index are available. I 
extended the sample size of the Democracy (good governance) portfolio in GIM (2003) by including firms with qualitatively 
similar  positive  monthly  alphas  and  re-grouping  the  Democracy  portfolio  as  firms  with  a  G-Index  score  of  7  or  less. 
Following this, Democracy firms now comprise 27.9 percent of the sample on average as compared to the original 9 percent. 
Similarly, I re-classified firms with a G-Index of 12 and above as Dictatorship (bad governance), now comprising 20.0 
percent of the sample on average, as compared to the original 5.5 percent. The remaining mixed governance firms, termed 
Drifter, have a G-Index between 8 and 11 and comprise 52.1 percent of the sample on average. For the stocks sorted by EQ, 
ten decile portfolios ranked by the magnitude of the residuals in the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model are formed three 
months after the end of each fiscal year to ensure that the financial statements are publicly available. The portfolio of firms 
with the lowest (highest) value in residuals is given an AA score of 1 (10). Similar to the approach used in sorting the firms 
into the three categories of governance structures, the group of firms with a score of 3 and below is re-classified as “Low or 
Income-Decreasing Abnormal Accruals (AA)”; those with a score between 4 and 7 are classified as “Mixed AA”; and finally, 
those with a score of 8 and above are classified as “High or Income-Increasing AA”. Panel A describes the overall sample 
period from September 1990 to December 2008; Panel B is the sub-period from September 1, 1991 to December 31, 1999 as 
in GIM (2003); and Panel C is the post-GIM sub-period from January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2008. All standard errors are 
White (1980) robust and the t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Levels of significance are indicated by *, **, *** for 
10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
Panel A: Overall sample period Sep 1, 1991 – Dec 31, 2008 
Portfolios  Low AA   Mixed AA  High AA  Overall 
































Panel B: Sub-period (1) Sep 1, 1991 – Dec 31, 1999 
Portfolios  Low AA   Mixed AA  High AA  Overall 
































Panel C: Sub-period (2) Jan 1, 2000 – Dec 31, 2008 
Portfolios  Low AA   Mixed AA  High AA  Overall 
































Table 8: Accruals reversal (Dechow and Dichev, 2002, without “look-ahead bias”) and future stock returns  
Table 8 reports the portfolios‟ value-weighted monthly alphas, estimated using Fama-French (1993) three-factor model and 
includes the Carhart (1997) momentum factor from WRDS.  
Rt = α + β1RMRFt + β2SMBt + β3HMLt + β4UMDt + εt 
The dependent variable is the value-weighted monthly portfolio excess return Rt. The explanatory variables RMRF, SMB, 
HML  and  UMD  are  the  returns  to  zero-investment  portfolios  designed  to  capture  market,  size,  book-to-market,  and 
momentum effects, respectively. The coefficients of these factors are not reported in the table for brevity. The portfolios are 
sorted two-dimensionally by governance and accruals reversal ACCREVt+1 (measured as the difference between accruals in 
the current period and accruals in the previous period, with the accruals being estimated as ∆WC in equation (2) in Dechow 
and Dichev (2002) model) that were described in Section 3. The stocks sorted by governance are reset in September 1990, 
July 1993, July 1995, February 1998, February 2000, February 2002, January 2004, and January 2006, which are the months 
when new data on G-Index are available. I extended the sample size of the Democracy (good governance) portfolio in GIM 
(2003) by including firms with qualitatively similar positive monthly alphas and re-grouping the Democracy portfolio as 
firms with a G-Index score of 7 or less. Following this, Democracy firms now comprise 27.9 percent of the sample on 
average as compared to the original 9 percent. Similarly, I re-classified firms with a G-Index of 12 and above as Dictatorship 
(bad governance), now comprising 20.0 percent of the sample on average, as compared to the original 5.5 percent. The 
remaining mixed governance firms, termed Drifter, have a G-Index between 8 and 11 and comprise 52.1 percent of the 
sample on average. The magnitude of ACCREVt+1 is sorted and ranked to form ten decile portfolios three months after the 
end of each fiscal year to ensure that the financial statements are publicly available, and then they are matched with the 
monthly CRSP returns in period t+1. The portfolio of firms with the lowest (highest) value in ACCREVt+1 is given an 
accruals reversal score of 1 (10). The group of firms with a score of 3 and below is re-classified as big net negative accruals 
reversal (Negative Accruals Reversal); those with a score between 4 and 7 are classified as mixed accruals reversal (Mixed 
Accruals Reversal); and finally, those with a score of 8 and above are classified as big net positive accruals reversal (Positive 
Accruals Reversal). Panel A describes the overall sample period from September 1990 to December 2008; Panel B is the 
sub-period from September 1, 1991 to December 31, 1999 as in GIM (2003); and Panel C is the post-GIM sub-period from 
January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2008.  All standard errors are White (1980) robust and the t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. Levels of significance are indicated by *, **, *** for 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
Panel A: Overall sample period Sep 1, 1991 – Dec 31, 2008 







































Panel B: Sub-period (1) Sep 1, 1991 – Dec 31, 1999 







































Panel C: Sub-period (2) Jan 1, 2000 – Dec 31, 2008 









































Aboody, Hughes and Liu (2005), Earnings Quality, Insider Trading, and Cost of Capital, 
Journal of Accounting Research 43(5): 651-673 
Ahmed, Takeda, and Thomas (1999), Bank loan loss provisions: A re-examination of capital 
management,  earnings  management  and  signalling  effects,  Journal  of  Accounting  & 
Economics 28: 1-25 
Alford and Zmijewski (1994), Extensions and violations of the statutory SEC Form 10-K 
filing requirements, Journal of Accounting & Economics 17: 229-254 
Allen,  Larson,  and  Sloan  (2010),  Accrual  reversals,  earnings  and  stock  returns,  working 
paper 
Amir  and  Lev  (1996),  Value-Relevance  of  Nonfinancial  Information:  The  Wireless 
Communications Industry, Journal of Accounting & Economics 22: 3-30 
Ang, Cole, and Lin (2000), Agency costs and ownership structure, Journal of Finance 55 (1): 
81–106 
Arya (2003), Are unmanaged earnings always better for shareholders, Accounting Horizons 
(Supplement): 111-116 
Arya,  Glover,  and  Sunder  (1998),  Earnings  management  and  the  Revelation  Principle, 
Review of Accounting Studies 3: 7-34 
Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, Kinney, and LaFond (2008), The effect of SOX internal control 
deficiencies and their remediation on accrual quality, Accounting Review 83: 217-250 
Ayers,  Jiang,  and  Yeung  (2006),  Discretionary  accruals  and  earnings  management:  An 
analysis of pseudo earnings target, Accounting Review 81(3): 617-652 
Baber, Chen, and Kang, (2006), Stock price reaction to evidence of earnings management: 
Implications for supplementary financial disclosure, Review of Accounting Studies 11: 5-
19 
Ball  and  Shivakumar  (2008),  Earnings  quality  at  initial  public  offerings,  Journal  of 
Accounting & Economics 45: 324-349 
Ball,  Jayaraman,  and  Shivakumar  (2010),  Audited  Financial  Reporting  and  Voluntary 
Disclosure as Complements: A Test of the Confirmatory Hypothesis, working paper  
Balsam  (1998),  Discretionary  accounting  choices  and  CEO  compensation,  Contemporary 
Accounting Research 15: 229-252 
Barth,  Elliott,  and  Finn  (1999),  Market  Rewards  Associated  with  Patterns  of  Increasing 
Earnings, Journal of Accounting Research 37(2):387-413 
Barth, Beaver and Landsman (2001), The relevance of value relevance literature for financial 
accounting standard-setting: Another view, Journal of Accounting and Economics 29: 1-
51 
Barton, Hansen and Pownall (2010), Which Performance Measures Do Investors Around the 
World Value the Most – and Why? Accounting Review 85(3): 753-789 
Bartov, Gul, and Tsui (2001), Discretionary accruals models and audit qualifications, Journal 
of Accounting & Economics 30: 421-452 
Bartov, Givoly, and Hayn (2002), The rewards to meeting or beating earnings expectations, 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 33 (2): 173–204 
Bartov and Mohanram (2004), Private information, eamings manipulations, and executive 
stock option exercises, Accounting Review 79 (4): 889-920 
Bartov and Cohen (2009), The “Numbers Game” in the Pre- and Post-Sarbox Eras, Journal of 
Accounting, Auditing & Finance: 505-534 
Beasley  (1996),  An  empirical  analysis  of  the  relation  between  the  board  of  director 
composition and financial statement fraud, Accounting Review 71: 443-465  65 
 
Beatty, Liao and Weber (2010), The effect of private information and monitoring on the role 
of accounting quality in investment decisions, Contemporary Accounting Research 27(1): 
17-47 
Beaver, Eger, Ryan, and Wolfson (1989), Financial reporting and the structure of bank share 
prices, Journal of Accounting Research 27: 157-178  
Beaver and Engel (1996), Discretionary behavior with respect to allowances for loan loasses 
and the behavior of stock prices, Journal of Accounting & Economics 22: 177-206 
Bebchuk,  Cohen  and  Farrell  (2009),  What  Matters  in  Corporate  Governance?  Review  of 
Financial Studies 22 (2): 783-827 
Bebchuk,  Cohen  and  Wang  (2010),  Learning  and  the  Disappearing  Association  Between 
Governance and Returns, working paper 
Becker,  DeFond,  Jiambalvo,  and  Subramanyam  (1998),  The  effect  of  audit  quality  on 
earnings management, Contemporary Accounting Research 15(1): 1-24 
Beneish (1997), Detecting GAAP violations: Implications for assessing earnings management 
among  firms  with  extreme  financial  performance,  Journal  of  Accounting  and  Public 
Policy 16: 271-309  
Beneish, Lee, and Tarpley (2001), Contextual Fundamental Analysis through the Prediction 
of Extreme Returns, Review of Accounting Studies 6: 165-189 
Bergstresser and Philippon (2006), CEO incentives and earnings management, Journal of 
Financial Economics 80 (3): 511-529 
Bertrand  and  Mullainathan  (2003),  Enjoying  the  Quiet  Life?  Corporate  Governance  and 
Managerial Preferences, Quarterly Journal of Economics 111(5): 1043-75 
Biddle  and  Hilary  (2006),  Accounting  Quality  and  Firm-Level  Capital  Investment, 
Accounting Review 81(5): 963-982 
Biddle, Hilary and Verdi (2009), How does financial reporting quality relate to investment 
efficiency? Journal of Accounting & Economics 48: 112-131 
Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2009), Shackling short-sellers: The 2008 shorting ban, working 
paper 
Bowen, Rajgopal, and Venkatachalam (2008), Accounting Discretion, Corporate Governance 
and Firm Performance, Contemporary Accounting Research 25(2): 351-405 
Boyson,  Stahel,  and Stulz (2008), Why do hedge funds‟ worst returns cluster? Common 
liquidity shocks vs. contagion, working paper  
Bradshaw,  Richardson,  and  Sloan  (2001),  Do  analysts  and  auditors  use  information  in 
accruals, Journal of Accounting Research 39(1): 45-74 
Brockman (2000), The Greatest Inventions of the Past 2,000 Years, Simon & Schuster  
Brown and Caylor (2006), Corporate Governance and Firm Valuation, Journal of Accounting 
and Public Policy July-Aug: 409-34  
Burns and Kedia (2006), The impact of performance-based compensation on misreporting, 
Journal of Financial Economics 79 (1): 35-67 
Bushman and Smith (2001), Financial Accounting Information and Corporate Governance, 
Journal of Accounting & Economics 32: 237-333 
Bushman, Chen, Engel, and Smith (2004), Financial accounting information, organizational 
complexity and corporate governance systems, Journal of Accounting & Economics 37: 
167-201 
Butler, Leone, and Willenborg (2004), An empirical analysis of auditor reporting and its 
association with abnormal accruals, Journal of Accounting & Economics 37: 139-165 
Caramanis and Lennox (2008), Audit effort and earnings management, Journal of Accounting 
& Economics 45: 116-138 
Carhart (1997), On persistence in mutual fund performance, Journal of Finance 52: 57-82 66 
 
Caylor  (2010),  Strategic  revenue  recognition  to  achieve  earnings  benchmark,  Journal  of 
Accounting & Public Policy 29: 82-95 
Chan, Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (2006), Earnings quality and stock returns, Journal 
of Business 79: 1041-82 
Chaney and Lewis (1998), The use of accruals in income smoothing: A permanent earnings 
hypothesis, Advances in Quantitative Analysis of Finance & Accounting 6: 103 -135 
Chen, K., and J. Lee (1995), Executive bonus plans and accounting trade-offs: The case of 
the oil and gas industry, 1985–1986, Accounting Review 70(1): 91–111 
Chen, Lin, and Lin (2008), Audit partner tenure, audit firm tenure, and discretionary accruals: 
Does long auditor tenure impair earnings quality?  Contemporary Accounting Research 
25(2): 415-45 
Cheng and Warfield (2005), Equity incentives and earnings management, Accounting Review 
80(2): 441-476 
Christie  and  Zimmerman  (1994),  Efficient  and  opportunistic  choices  of  accounting 
procedures: Corporate control contests, Accounting Review 69 (4): 539–66 
Chung and Kallapur (2003), Client importance, nonaudit services, and abnormal accruals, 
Accounting Review 78: 931-955 
Cohen, Dey, and Lys (2008), Real and accrual-based earnings management in the pre and 
post SOX periods, Accounting Review 83(3): 757-787 
Cohen (2010), Accrual-based and real earnings management activities around SEOs, Journal 
of Accounting & Economics, forthcoming   
Collins and DeAngelo (1990), Accounting information and corporate governance: Market 
and  analyst  reactions  to  earnings  of  firms  engaged  in  proxy  contests,  Journal  of 
Accounting & Economics 13: 213-247 
Collins, Maydew and Weiss (1997), Changes in the value-relevance of earnings and book 
values over the past forty years, Journal of Accounting and Economics 24: 39-67 
Collins and Hribar (2002), Errors in estimating accruals: Implications for accounting research, 
Journal of Accounting Research 40: 105-134 
Cooper,  Gulen,  and  Schill  (2008),  Asset  growth  and  the  cross-section  of  stock  returns, 
Journal of Finance 63: 1609-1651 
Core, Gray and Rusticus (2006), Does Weak Governance Cause Weak Stock Returns? An 
Examination  of  Firm  Operating  Performance  and  Investors‟  Expectations,  Journal  of 
Finance 61: 655-87  
Core  (2006),  Discussion  of  An  analysis  of  the  theories  and  explanations  offered  for  the 
mispricing of accruals and accruals components, Journal of Accounting Research 44(2): 
341-350 
Cornett, Marcus, and Tehranian (2007), Corporate governance and pay-for-performance: the 
impact of earnings management, Journal of Financial Economics 86: 279-305 
Cremers and Nair (2005), Governance Mechanisms and Equity Prices, Journal of Finance 60: 
2859-2894 
Daines,  Gow  and  Larcker  (2010),  Rating  the  Ratings:  How  Good  Are  the  Commercial 
Governance Ratings? Journal of Financial Economics, forthcoming 
Darrough and Rangan (2005), Do insiders manipulate earnings when they sell their shares in 
an initial public offering? Journal of Accounting Research 43: 1-33 
DeAngelo  (1988),  Managerial  competition,  information  costs,  and  corporate  governance, 
Journal of Accounting & Economics 10: 3-36 
DeAngelo,  DeAngelo,  and  Skinner  (1994),  Accounting  choice  in  troubled  companies, 
Journal of Accounting & Economics 17 (1-2): 113–143 67 
 
Dechow (1994), Accounting earnings and cash flows as measures of firm performance: The 
role of accounting accruals, Journal of Accounting & Economics 18: 3-42 
Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995), Detecting earnings management, Accounting Review 
70(2): 193–225 
Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1996), Causes and consequences of earnings manipulations: 
An  analysis  of  firms  subject  to  enforcement  actions  by  the  SEC,  Contemporary 
Accounting Research 13(1): 1–36 
Dechow and Skinner (2000), Earnings management: Reconciling the views of accounting 
academics, practitioners, and regulators, Accounting Horizons 14(2): 235-250 
Dechow  and  Dichev  (2002),  The  quality  of  accruals  and  earnings:  The  role  of  accrual 
estimation errors, Accounting Review 77 (Supplement): 35-59 
Dechow and Ge (2006), The persistence of earnings and cash flows and the role of special 
items: Implications for the accrual anomaly, Review of Accounting Studies 11: 253-296 
Dechow, Richardson, and Sloan (2008), The persistence and pricing of the cash component 
of earnings, Journal of Accounting Research 46(3): 537-566 
Dechow, Ge and Schrand (2009), Understanding Earnings Quality: A Review of the Proxies, 
Their Determinants, and their Consequences, working paper  
DeFond and Park (1997), Smoothing income in anticipation of future earnings, Journal of 
Accounting & Economics 23: 115-139 
DeFond and Subramanyam (1998), Auditor changes and discretionary accruals, Journal of 
Accounting & Economics 25: 35-67 
DeFond  and  Park  (2001),  The  Reversal  of  Abnormal  Accruals  and  Earnings  Surprises, 
Accounting Review 76(3): 375-404 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985), The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences, 
Journal of Political Economy XCIII: 1155–77 
Demski (1998), Performance measure manipulation, Contemporary Accounting Research 15: 
261-285 
Demski, Frimor, and Sappington (2004), Efficient manipulation in a repeated setting, Journal 
of Accounting Research 42(1): 31-49 
Desai, Rajgopal, and Venkatachalam (2004), Value-Glamour and Accruals Mispricing: One 
Anomaly or Two? Accounting Review 79: 355–85 
Desai,  Hogan,  and  Wilkins  (2006),  The  reputational  penalty  for  aggressive  accounting: 
Earnings restatements and management turnover, Accounting Review 81: 83-112 
Djankov,  La  Porta,  Silanes,  Shleifer  (2008),  The  Law  and  Economics  of  Self-Dealing, 
Journal of Financial Economics 88: 430-465 
Doyle, Ge, and McVay (2007), Accruals quality and internal control over financial reporting, 
Accounting Review 82: 1141-70 
Efendi,  Srivastava,  and  Swanson  (2007),  Why  do  corporate  managers  misstate  financial 
statements?  The  role  of  option  compensation  and  other  factors,  Journal  of  Financial 
Economics 85: 667-708 
Fairfield, Whisenant, and Yohn (2003), Accrued earnings and growth: Implications for future 
profitability and market mispricing, Accounting Review 78: 353–371 
Fairfield (2006), Discussion of The persistence of earnings and cash flows and the role of 
special items: Implications for the accrual anomaly, Review of Accounting Studies 11: 297-
303 
Fama and French (1993), Common risk factors in the returns on bonds and stocks, Journal of 
Financial Economics: 3-56 
Fama and French (1995), Size and Book-to-Market Factors in Earnings and Returns, Journal 
of Finance (1): 131-155 68 
 
Fama and French (1996), Multifactor explanations of asset pricing anomalies,  Journal of 
Finance 51: 55-84 
Fama and French (2008), Dissecting Anomalies, Journal of Finance 63: 1653-78 
Farrell and Whidbee (2003), The impact of firm performance expectations on CEO turnover 
and replacement decisions, Journal of Accounting & Economics 36 (1-3): 165-96 
Fink (1999), Smooth Operator, CFO (August 1) 15(8): 34-40 
Francis  and  Schipper  (1999),  Have  financial  statements  lost  their  relevance?  Journal  of 
Accounting Research 37: 319-352 
Francis and Krishnan (1999), Accounting Accruals and Auditor Conservatism, Contemporary 
Accounting Research 16(1): 135-65 
Francis,  LaFond,  Olsson  and  Schipper  (2004),  Cost  of  equity  and  earnings  attributes, 
Accounting Review 79: 967-1010 
Francis,  LaFond,  Olsson  and  Schipper  (2005),  The  market  pricing  of  accruals  quality, 
Journal of Accounting & Economics 37: 295-327 
Francis,  Nanda  and  Olsson  (2008),  Voluntary  Disclosure,  Earnings  Quality,  and  Cost  of 
Capital, Journal of Accounting Research 46(1); 53-99 
Francis and Wang (2008), The joint effect of investor protection and Big 4 audits on earnings 
quality around the world, Contemporary Accounting Research 25(1): 157-91 
Francis,  Huang,  Rajgopal,  and  Zang  (2008),  CEO  reputation  and  earnings  quality, 
Contemporary Accounting Research 25(1): 109-47 
Frankel,  Johnson,  and  Nelson  (2002),  The  relation  between  auditors‟  fees  for  non-audit 
services and earnings management, Accounting Review 77 (Supplement): 71-105  
Garcí a,  Garcí a,  and  Penalva  (2009),  Accounting  conservatism  and  corporate  governance, 
Review of Accounting Studies 14: 161-201 
Gaver,  Gaver,  and  Austin  (1995),  Additional  evidence  on  bonus  plans  and  income 
management, Journal of Accounting and Economics 19 (1): 3–28 
Geiger (2006), Does Hiring a New CFO Change Things? An Investigation of Changes in 
Discretionary Accruals, Accounting Review 81(4): 781-809 
Ghosh, Gu, and Jain (2005), Sustained earnings and revenue growth, earnings quality, and 
earnings response coefficients, Review of Accounting Studies 10: 33-57 
Ghosh  and  Olsen  (2009),  Environmental  uncertainty  and  managers‟  use  of  discretionary 
accruals, Accounting, Organizations & Society 34: 188-205 
Givoly, Hayn, and Katz (2010), Does Public Ownership of Equity Improve Earnings Quality, 
Accounting Review 85(1): 195-225  
Goel and Thakor (2003), Why do firms smooth earnings? Journal of Business 76(1): 151-193 
Gompers,  Ishii,  and  Metrick  (2003),  Corporate  Governance  and  Equity  Prices,  Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 118:107–55 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2010), Extreme Governance: An Analysis of Dual-Class Firms 
in the United States, Review of Financial Studies 23(3): 1051-88 
Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal (2005), The Economic Implications of Corporate Financial 
Reporting, Journal of Accounting & Economics 40: 3-73 
Green, Hand and Soliman (2009), The Demise of the Accruals Anomaly, working paper 
Guay, Kothari, and Watts (1996), A market based evaluation of discretionary accruals models, 
Journal of Accounting Research 34(Supplement): 83–105 
Guay  (2008),  Discussion  of  “Accounting  Discretion,  Corporate  Governance,  and  Firm 
Performance”, Contemporary Accounting Research 25(2): 407-13 
Guidry, Leone, and Rock (1999), Earnings-based bonus plans and earnings management by 
business-unit managers, Journal of Accounting& Economics 26 (1–3): 113–42 69 
 
Gul, Chen, and Tsui (2003), Discretionary accounting accruals, managers‟ incentives, and 
audit fees, Contemporary Accounting Research 20(3): 441–464 
Habib (2007), “Benchmark-beating” as evidence of earnings management: Review of the 
literature, working paper  
Haw, Hu, Hwang, and Wu (2004), Ultimate ownership, income management, and legal and 
extra-legal institutions, Journal of Accounting Research 42: 423-462 
Healy (1985), The effect of bonus schemes on accounting decisions, Journal of Accounting & 
Economics 7 (3): 85-107 
Healy and Palepu (1993), The effect of firms‟ financial disclosure strategies on stock prices, 
Accounting Horizons 7(1): 1–11 
Healy (1996), Discussion of a Market-Based Evaluation of Discretionary Accruals Models, 
Journal of Accounting Research 34 (Supplement): 107-115 
Healy and Whalen (1999), A review of earnings management literature and its implications 
for standard setting, Accounting Horizons 13(4): 365-384 
Healy  (1999),  Discussion  of  Earnings-based  bonus  plans  and  earnings  management  by 
business-unit managers, Journal of Accounting& Economics 26 (1–3): 143-147 
Heninger  (2001),  The  association  between  auditor  litigation  and  abnormal  accruals, 
Accounting Review 76, 111-126 
Hermalin  and  Weisbach  (2003),  Boards  of  Directors  as  Endogenously  Determined 
Institutions: A Survey of the Economic Literature, Economic Policy Review 9: 7-26 
Holthausen  and  Leftwich  (1983),  The  economic  consequences  of  accounting  choice: 
Implications of costly contracting and monitoring, Journal of Accounting and Economics 
5: 77-118 
Holthausen (1990), Accounting method choice: Opportunistic behavior, efficient contracting 
and information perspectives, Journal of Accounting and Economics 12, 207-218 
Holthausen  and  Watts  (2001),  The  value  relevance  of  the  value-relevance  literature  for 
financial accounting standard setting, Journal of Accounting and Economics 31: 3-75  
Hribar and Nichols (2007), The Use of Unsigned Earnings Quality Measures in Tests of 
Earnings Management, Journal of Accounting Research 45(5): 1017-53 
Iliev (2010), The effect of SOX Section 404: Costs, Earnings Quality, and Stock Prices, 
Journal of Finance 65(3): 1163-96 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial Economics 3: 305-360 
Jensen  (1986),  Agency  Costs  of  Free  Cash  Flow,  Corporate  Finance,  and  Takeovers, 
American Economic Review 76(2): 323-329 
Jiang (2008), Beating earnings benchmark and the cost of debt, Accounting Review 83(2): 
377-416 
Jiang, Petroni, and Wang (2010), CFOs and CEOs: Who have the most influence on earnings 
management, Journal of Financial Economics 96: 513-526 
Johnson,  Khurana,  and  Reynolds  (2002),  Audit-firm  tenure  and  the  quality  of  financial 
reports, Contemporary Accounting Research 19: 637-660 
Johnson, Moorman and Sorescu (2009), A Re-examination of Corporate Governance and 
Equity Prices, Review of Financial Studies 22 (11): 4753-86 
Jones  (1991),  Earnings  management  during  import  relief  investigations,  Journal  of 
Accounting Research 29: 193-228 
Jones  and  Lamont  (2002),  Short-sale  constraints  and  stock  returns,  Journal  of  Financial 
Economics 66: 207-239 70 
 
Jones, Krishnan, and Melendrez (2008), Do models of discretionary accruals detect actual 
cases  of  fraudulent  and  restated  earnings?  An  empirical  analysis,  Contemporary 
Accounting Research 25(2): 499-531  
Joos (2003), Discussion of How representative are firms that are cross-listed in the United 
States? An analysis of accounting quality, Journal of Accounting Research 41: 387-396 
Kasznik and McNichols (2002), Does Meeting Earnings Expectations Matter? Evidence from 
Analyst Forecast Revisions and Share Prices, Journal of Accounting Research 40(3): 727-
759 
Katz (2009), Earnings Quality and Ownership Structure: The Role of Private Equity Sponsors, 
Accounting Review 84(3): 623-658 
Khandani and Lo (2008), What happened to the Quants in August 2007? Evidence from 
factors and transactions data, working paper  
Kinney (2002), Discussion of The relation between auditors‟ fees for non-audit services and 
earnings management, Accounting Review 77 (Supplement): 107-114  
Klein (2002), Audit committee, board of director characteristics, and earnings management, 
Journal of Accounting & Economics 33: 375-400 
Koonce and Lipe (2010), Earnings Trend and Performance Relative to Benchmarks: How 
Consistency Influences Their Joint Use, Journal of Accounting Research 48(4): 859-884 
Kothari (2001), Capital markets research in accounting, Journal of Accounting & Economics 
31, 105-231 
Kraft, Leone, and Wasley (2006), Discussion of An analysis of the theories and explanations 
offered for the mispricing of accruals and accruals components, Journal of Accounting 
Research 44(2): 297-339 
La Porta, Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2000), Investor Protection and Corporate Governance, 
Journal of Financial Economics 58: 3-27  
Lakonishok,  Shleifer,  and  Vishny  (1994),  Contrarian  investment,  extrapolation,  and  risk, 
Journal of Finance 49: 1541–1578 
Lang, Raedy, and Yetman (2003), How representative are firms that are cross-listed in the 
United States? An analysis of accounting quality, Journal of Accounting Research 41: 
363-386 
Larcker  and  Richardson  (2004),  Fees  paid  to  audit  firms,  accrual  choices,  and  corporate 
governance, Journal of Accounting Research 42: 625-658 
Larcker, Richardson and Tuna (2005), How Important Is Corporate Governance, working 
paper 
Larcker, Richardson and Tuna (2007), Corporate Governance, Accounting Outcomes, and 
Organizational Performance, Accounting Review 82 (4): 963-1008 
Larcker and Rusticus (2010), On the Use of Instrumental Variables in Accounting Research, 
Journal of Accounting & Economics 49: 186-205 
Lee, C. (2001), Market efficiency and accounting research: a discussion of “capital market 
research in accounting” by S.P. Kothari, Journal of Accounting & Economics 31: 233-253 
Lee,  Li,  and  Yue  (2006),  Performance,  growth,  and  earnings  management,  Review  of 
Accounting Studies 11: 305-334 
Leone and Rock (2002), Empirical tests of budget ratcheting and its effect on managers‟ 
discretionary accrual choices, Journal of Accounting & Economics 33: 43-67 
Lev and Zarowin (1999), The boundaries of financial reporting and how to extend them, 
Journal of Accounting Research 37: 353-385 
Lev, and Nissim (2006), The persistence of the accruals anomaly. Contemporary Accounting 
Research 23 (1): 193-226 71 
 
Levi (2008), Voluntary disclosure of accruals in earnings press releases and the pricing of 
accruals, Review of Accounting Studies 13: 1-21 
Lo (2008), Earnings management and earnings quality, Journal of Accounting & Economics 
45: 350-357 
Louis and Robinson (2005), Do managers credibly use accruals to signal private information? 
Evidence  from  the  pricing  of  discretionary  accruals  around  stock  splits,  Journal  of 
Accounting & Economics 39, 361-380 
Louis, Robinson, and Sbaraglia (2008), An integrated analysis of the association between 
accrual disclosure and the abnormal accrual anomaly, Review of Accounting Studies 13: 
23-54 
Malmquist (1990), Efficient contracting and the choice of accounting method in the oil and 
gas industry, Journal of Accounting & Economics 12: 173-205 
Marquardt and Wiedman (2005), How are earnings managed? An examination of specific 
accruals, Contemporary Accounting Research 21(2): 461-491 
Matsunaga (1995), The effects of financial reporting costs on the use of employee stock 
options, Accounting Review 70(1): 1-26 
Matsunaga and Park (2001), The effect of missing a quarterly eamings benchmark on the 
CEO's annual bonus, Accounting Review 16 (3): 313-32 
McNichols and Wilson (1988), Evidence of earnings management from the provision for bad 
debts, Journal of Accounting Research 26 (Supplement): 1–31 
McNichols  (2000),  Research  design  issues  in  earnings  management  studies,  Journal  of 
Accounting and Public Policy 19: 313-345 
McNichols (2002), Discussion of the quality of accruals and earnings: The role of accrual 
estimation errors, Accounting Review 77 (Supplement): 61-69 
McNichols  and  Stubben  (2008),  Does  Earnings  Management  Affect  Firms‟  Investment 
Decisions?”The Accounting Review 83: 1571-1603 
Menon  and  Williams  (2004),  Former  audit  partners  and  abnormal  accruals,  Accounting 
Review 79 (4): 1095-118 
Mitchell, Pedersen, and Pulvino (2007), Slow moving capital, American Economic Review 
(Papers & Proceedings) 97: 215-220 
Moore  (1973),  Management  changes  and  discretionary  accounting  decisions,  Journal  of 
Accounting Research 11: 100-107 
Murphy and Zimmerman (1993), Financial performance surrounding CEO turnover, Journal 
of Accounting & Economics 16: 
Newman (1988), Discussion of An explanation of income smoothing, Journal of Accounting 
Research 26: 140-143  
Peasnell, Pope, and Young (2005), Board monitoring and earnings management: Do outside 
directors influence abnormal accruals? Journal of Business Finance and Accounting 32: 
1311–46 
Perry  and  Williams  (1994),  Earnings  management  preceding  MBO  offers,  Journal  of 
Accounting & Economics 18: 157-179 
Pincus, Rajgopal and Venkatachalam (2007), The accrual anomaly: International evidence, 
Accounting Review 82(1): 169-203 
Pourciau  (1993),  Earnings  management  and  non-routine  executive  changes,  Journal  of 
Accounting & Economics 16: 317-336 
Richardson, Sloan, Soliman, and Tuna (2005), Accrual reliability, earnings persistence, and 
stock prices, Journal of Accounting & Economics 39: 437-485 
Richardson, Sloan, Soliman, and Tuna (2006), The implications of accounting distortions and 
growth for accruals and profitability, Accounting Review 81(3): 713-743 72 
 
Richardson, Tuna, and Wysocki (2009), Accounting Anomalies and Fundamental Analysis, 
Journal of Accounting & Economics, forthcoming 
Schipper (1989), Commentary on Earnings Management, Accounting Horizons (December): 
91-102 
Schipper and Vincent (2003), Earnings Quality, Accounting Horizons 17: 97-110 
Shevlin (1996), The Value-Relevance of Nonfinancial Information: A Discussion, Journal of 
Accounting & Economics 22: 31-42 
Shivakumar  (2000),  Do  firms  mislead  investors  by  overstating  earnings  before  seasoned 
equity offerings? Journal of Accounting and Economics 29: 339-371 
Shleifer  and  Vishny  (1988),  Value  maximization  and  the  acquisition  process,  Journal  of 
Economic Perspectives 2(1): 7-20 
Shleifer  and  Vishny  (1989),  Managerial  entrenchment:  The  case  of  manager-specific 
investments, Journal of Financial Economics 25: 123-139 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997), The Limits of Arbitrage, Journal of Finance 52(1): 93-117 
Skinner and Sloan (2002), Earnings surprises, growth expectations and stock returns, or don‟t 
let an earnings torpedo sink your portfolio, Review of Accounting Studies 7: 289-312 
Skypala (2009), “Quant creator” says now is a good time to be different, Financial Times 
(January 26, 2009): 4 
Sloan (1996), Do stock prices  fully reflect  information in  accruals  and cash  flows  about 
future earnings? Accounting Review 71 (3): 289–315 
Sloan (2001), Financial Accounting and Corporate Governance: A Discussion, Journal of 
Accounting & Economics 32: 335-347  
Sloan (2001), Discussion of „Contextual Fundamental  Analysis through the Prediction  of 
Extreme Returns, Review of Accounting Studies 6: 191-195 
Smith (1993), Earnings and management incentives, Journal of Accounting & Economics 16: 
337-347 
Smith  (1993),  A  perspective  on  accounting-based  debt  covenant  violations,  Accounting 
Review 68(2): 289-303  
Sorensen, Hua, and Qian (2005), Contextual Fundamentals, Models, and Active Management, 
Journal of Portfolio Management (Fall): 23-36 
Srinidhi  and  Gul  (2007),  The  differential  effects  of  auditors‟  nonaudit and  audit  fees  on 
accrual quality, Contemporary Accounting Research 24(2): 595-629 
Stein (2009), Sophisticated Investors and Market Efficiency (Presidential Address), Journal 
of Finance 64(4):1517-48 
Subramanyam  (1996),  The  pricing  of  discretionary  accruals,  Journal  of  Accounting  and 
Economics 22 (1–3): 249–81 
Sweeney (1994), Debt-covenant violations and managers‟ accounting responses, Journal of 
Accounting & Economics 17: 281-308 
Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998a), Earnings management and the long run underperformance 
of seasoned equity offerings, Journal of Financial Economics 50: 53-100 
Teoh,  Welch,  and  Wong  (1998b),  Earnings  management  and  the  subsequent  market 
performance of initial public offerings, Journal of Finance 53: 1935-74 
The Department of the Treasury (2008), Final Report of the Advisory Committee on the 
Auditing Profession to the U.S. Department of Treasury  
Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004), Capital investments and stock returns, Journal of Financial & 
Quantitative Analysis 39: 677–700 
Trammell (2010), Illuminating the Accruals Anomaly, CFA Digest (Jan-Feb): 38-41 
Trueman and Titman (1988), An explanation of income smoothing, Journal of Accounting 
Research 26: 127-139  73 
 
Tucker  and  Zarowin  (2006),  Does  income  smoothing  improve  earnings  informativeness, 
Accounting Review 81(1): 251-270 
Wahlen (1994), The nature of information in commercial loan loss disclosures, Accounting 
Review 69: 455-478 
Wang  (2006),  Founding  Family  Ownership  and  Earnings  Quality,  Journal  of  Accounting 
Research 44(3): 619-656 
Warfield,  Wild,  and  Wild  (2005),  Managerial  ownership,  accounting  choices  and  the 
informativeness of earnings, Journal of Accounting & Economics 20: 61-91 
Watts and Zimmerman (1978), Towards a positive theory of the determination of accounting 
standards, Accounting Review 53 (1): 112-134 
Watts  and  Zimmerman  (1986),  Positive  Theory  of  Accounting,  Prentice-Hall,  Inc., 
Englewood Cliffs, NJ 
Watts  and  Zimmerman  (1990),  Positive  accounting  theory:  A  ten-year  perspective, 
Accounting Review 65 (1): 131-156 
Weisbach  (1988),  Outside  directors  and  CEO  turnover,  Journal  of  Financial  Economics 
20:431-460 
Xie, H. (2001), The mispricing of abnormal accruals, Accounting Review 76 (3): 357-373 
Zhang, F. (2007), Accruals, investment, and the accruals anomaly, Accounting Review 82: 
1333-64 